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ABSTRACT 
 The essential nature of the homeland security enterprise involves making 
consequential and complex policy decisions under uncertainty. The inputs that policy 
makers use in making these decisions are facts, analyses, and predictions (which can fit a 
definition of intelligence)—all of which are subject to significant uncertainty. This thesis 
seeks to improve analysis by developing a crowd-based analytic methodology to address 
the problem of intelligence analysis while accounting for, and taking advantage of, the 
unique characteristics of the intelligence analysis process and the U.S. Intelligence 
Community culture itself. The thesis’s proposed methodology applies learning regarding 
crowdsourcing and prediction markets–based forecasting in a new context—that of 
intelligence analysis and the Intelligence Community. If the Intelligence Community 
implements the crowd-based analytic proposed methodology, which has achieved results 
in other contexts, it should improve its predictions of real-world events. 
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The essential nature of the homeland security enterprise involves making 
consequential and complex policy decisions under uncertainty. The inputs that policy 
makers use in making these decisions are facts, analyses, and predictions (which can fit a 
definition of intelligence), all of which are subject to significant uncertainty. Reduction in 
the uncertainty associated with these inputs may improve the soundness of decision-
making by policy makers. This thesis seeks to improve analysis by developing a crowd-
based analytic methodology to address the problem of intelligence analysis while 
accounting for and taking advantage of the unique characteristics of the intelligence 
analysis process and the U.S. Intelligence Community culture itself.  
The methodology developed in this thesis utilizes prediction markets–based 
techniques and crowdsourcing techniques that have significantly improved forecast 
accuracy in other contexts found in the literature. The thesis’s particular contribution 
focuses on understanding the unique characteristics of the Intelligence Community 
culture and work processes, and it uses this understanding to inform the design of the 
proposed crowd-based intelligence forecasting methodology. It can be argued that any 
analytic methodology hoping to improve the predictive accuracy of the Intelligence 
Community analysts must both reflect and adapt to the underlying Intelligence 
Community culture. If it does not, it is likely that any new or modified methodology 
either may be limited in its adoption, or more likely, be ignored by the intelligence 
analytic community at large.  
The thesis’s proposed methodology applies learning regarding crowdsourcing and 
prediction markets-based forecasting in a new context, that of intelligence analysis and 
the Intelligence Community. This research excludes quantitative probabilistic 
assessments, quantitative and qualitative models, and polls-based techniques from 
consideration because others have already done extensive work on utilizing these 
techniques in an intelligence context.  
xvi 
This thesis discusses the characteristics of the proposed crowd, the proposed 
structure of the forecasting effort, the proposed incentive structure, the proposed task 
design, and the proposed prediction market design and associated structural parameters 
underlying the forecasting effort, as well as the key characteristics of the proposed 
platform used to implement the prediction market. Additionally, the thesis uses all of 
these critical concepts to design a methodology—a crowd-sourced forecasting 
tournament—that the Intelligence Community can use to improve its forecast accuracy. If 
implemented, the proposed methodology should improve Intelligence Community 
predictions of real-world events, based on results achieved in other contexts. 
The thesis proposes that the utility of the methodology be demonstrated to the 
analytic branches of intelligence using a pilot program to help get buy-in to the 
methodology as a whole, as well as to engender participation in the methodology’s 
prediction market from individuals and teams drawn from the analytic community. If 
positive, the results of the pilot program may also be used to justify the Intelligence 
Community spending the financial, analytic time based, administrative time based, and 
other resources to implement the methodology. Finally, the proposed pilot should allow 
practitioners to test and tweak various aspects of the methodology from outreach to task 
design to ensure that the implemented methodology does indeed result in the analytic 
improvements as it seeks to do.  
This thesis is just a starting point; the methodology should be subject to several 
rounds of peer review and revision before implementation even in pilot form takes place. 
Once this review and revision occurs, practitioners can implement the pilot, and ascertain 
if the methodology creates consistently more accurate forecasts than traditional methods. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This thesis seeks to improve intelligence analysis by using relevant practices in 
crowdsourcing and prediction markets design, implementation, and operation to develop 
a crowd-based analytic methodology applicable to the problem of intelligence analysis. 
The methodology accounts for and takes advantage of the unique characteristics of the 
intelligence analysis process and of the Intelligence Community culture itself. The 
emphasis on Intelligence Community culture is deliberate as the proposed methodology 
seeks to improve forecasting by taking advantage of the same cultural characteristics that 
are problematic in traditional intelligence analysis that negatively affect forecast 
accuracy, forecast applicability, and forecast utility. The proposed methodology can be 
implemented, tested, and if successful, adopted by the Intelligence Community in an 
effort to address these cultural issues. Although the thesis proposes an analytic 
methodology to improve forecast and analytic accuracy, it leaves the implementation and 
testing of that methodology to others.  
The essential nature of the homeland security enterprise involves making 
consequential and complex policy decisions under uncertainty. Policy makers use inputs, 
such as facts, analyses, and predictions (which can fit a definition of intelligence) to make 
these decisions, all of which are subject to significant uncertainty. Reduction in the 
uncertainty associated with these inputs may improve the soundness of policy decisions. 
However, the enhancement of the predictive quality and accuracy of intelligence may not 
always improve decision quality and outcomes. Even if methodology, such as this thesis 
proposes, improves the quality and accuracy of intelligence inputs, it may not be possible 
to assess how these changes impact policy outcomes. Researchers usually perform 
assessments of policy outcomes well after the fact, such as the cases with the published 
examination of events leading up to Pearl Harbor and 9/11, which suggests a long lag 
time between analysis and its impact on the intelligence process. Still, it is unlikely that 
improvements to the quality and accuracy of intelligence in the short term may negatively 
2 
impact policy. Indeed, improvements in the quality and accuracy of intelligence leave 
policy makers in a better position.  
Although a number of preliminary efforts have been made to improve the 
Intelligence Community’s forecast accuracy to date, they do not appear to have led to a 
significant improvement in the ability of the Intelligence Community to anticipate and 
prevent terrorist attacks and other harmful events. Indeed, tactical and strategic surprises 
resulting from other actors’ actions (e.g., those of North Korea or Russia) are still 
problematic. However, the prospect of improving policy outcomes by enhancing the 
predictive quality and accuracy of intelligence does provide a rationale for the 
Intelligence Community to seek continual improvement in its analyses.  
One way to achieve improvements in analysis may be for the Intelligence 
Community to utilize crowd-based and prediction markets-based forecasting techniques. 
Indeed, in the past five years, the Intelligence Community has started to explore the 
potential of these techniques to improve its understanding of the timing, type, and 
qualitative and quantitative characteristics of events of interest to policy makers, and by 
definition, intelligence analysis. The Good Judgment Project is the most salient example 
of these attempts focusing on crowdsourcing in intelligence.  
The Good Judgment Project is sponsored by the Intelligence Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (IARPA) through its Aggregative Contingent Estimation (ACE) 
program.1 The project involves implementing crowdsourced prediction techniques for 
forecasting event outcomes related to questions of interest to the Intelligence Community 
and its clients. This project also tests the ability of graduate students, faculty, and 
practitioners from the political science realm to forecast global geopolitical events.2 
Surprisingly, in 2012, see The Good Judgment Project: A Large Scale Test of Different 
Methods of Combining Expert Predictions by Ungar et al. who found that the most 
successful lay forecasters participating in the project exceeded the success rate of career 
                                                 
1 “About IARPA,” Intelligence Advanced Research Agency, accessed February 3, 2017, https://www. 
iarpa.gov/index.php/about-iarpa.  
2 “About IARPA.”  
3 
intelligence analysts in predicting geopolitical events by over 30 percent.3 These 
successful lay forecasters are called superforecasters. Superforecasters are individuals 
and teams who are consistently better than the top two percent of all forecasters and make 
accurate forecasts about events of any type.4 
Other efforts using prediction markets-based techniques in non-intelligence 
contexts for the prediction of political, geopolitical, financial, and business related events 
have met with similar success, with success defined as making significantly more 
accurate forecasts than alternative techniques, such as surveys, polls, and fundamental 
analysis. Indeed, studies of the accuracy of prediction market forecasts under different 
scenarios have found prediction markets make accurate forecasts of events under a wide 
variety of conditions.5  
Despite significant evidence of the utility of crowd and prediction markets-based 
techniques in forecasting, the Intelligence Community does not seem to be utilizing these 
techniques as part of its analytic toolkit beyond general interest and a few pilot projects, 
like the Good Judgment Project. However, Kajdasz et al. examined the use of prediction 
markets in the Intelligence Community and provided direction for such an effort in the 
future. They say that any “Intelligence Community Prediction Markets (ICPM) should 
support decision makers, support analysts, identify the best forecasters in the Intelligence 
Community, and provide a test for future study.”6 
                                                 
3 Lyle Ungar et al., The Good Judgment Project: A Large Scale Test of Different Methods of 
Combining Expert Predictions, AAAI Technical Report FS-12-06 (Palo Alto, CA: Association for the 
Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, 2012).  
4 Tam Hunt, “How I Became a Superforecaster,” Slate, last updated November 19, 2015, http://www. 
slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/11/good_judgment_project_how_i_became_a_superforeca
ster_for_the_intelligence.html.  
5 Kenneth J. Arrow et al., “The Promise of Prediction Markets,” Science 320 (2008): 877–878; Joyce 
E. Berg, Forrest D. Nelson, and Thomas A. Rietz, “Prediction Market Accuracy in the Long Run,” 
International Journal of Forecasting 24, no. 2 (2008): 285–300.  
6 James E. Kajdasz et al., “An Alternative Analysis Technique: Examining the IC Prediction Market,” 
Studies in Intelligence 3, no. 58 (2014): 22–37.  
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B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research question for this thesis is how can a crowd-based analytical tool be 
developed for use by Intelligence Community superforecasters to improve the quality and 
accuracy of intelligence assessments? To answer this question, this thesis builds on work 
in the intelligence studies literature on prediction markets, such as the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s journal Studies in Intelligence, the International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, as well as works on prediction markets published in 
other journals or by students at academic institutions.  
C. THESIS ARGUMENT 
The thesis argues: 
• The combination of forecasts, using two independent sources (crowd-
based and prediction markets-based techniques) improves forecast 
accuracy. 
• Identification and application of relevant practices in crowd-based and 
prediction markets design, implementation, and operation drive the 
improved forecast accuracy. 
• Crowd-based and prediction markets-based forecasting techniques can 
overcome the impact of the characteristics of intelligence community 
culture that have negative consequences for traditional analytic 
forecasting. A methodology that adapts these techniques to Intelligence 
Community culture may result in increased Intelligence Community 
forecast accuracy, applicability, and utility. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The thesis’s research design guides the development of the arguments and 
methodologies that make up the thesis. Careful thought about and creation of a robust 
research design is critical to address the research question adequately and 
comprehensively.  
5 
1. Object of Study  
This thesis begins with an analysis of the implications of Intelligence Community 
culture for the accuracy, applicability, and utility of intelligence analysis. The goal of this 
thesis is to determine more precisely just how crowd- and prediction markets-based 
techniques can be applied within the Intelligence Community to improve forecast 
accuracy. Toward this end, the thesis analyzes practices in the application of crowd- and 
prediction markets-based techniques to forecasting in non-intelligence contexts. This 
researcher then uses this analysis to develop a crowd- and prediction markets-based 
forecasting methodology for use by the Intelligence Community that will result in more 
accurate forecasting and analysis. This methodology is designed to address the cultural 
drivers affecting forecast accuracy (or inaccuracy) within the Intelligence Community. 
While this thesis develops a plan for the implementation and testing of the proposed 
methodology, it leaves the actual implementation, testing, and validation of the 
methodology to others.  
2. Selection Criteria and Rationale 
To understand the object of study fully, it requires the selection and examination 
of the following: 
• Relevant information on the unique characteristics of the Intelligence 
Community, its culture, and its techniques for developing analytic 
products that policy makers use to support decision making. An 
understanding of Intelligence Community culture is critical to improving 
Intelligence Community forecast accuracy because intelligence 
community culture and its impact on traditional analysis is a key driver of 
forecast inaccuracy.  
• Relevant information on the design, testing, accuracy, efficacy, and 
operational and evaluative processes related to prediction markets, 
crowdsourcing of analytic inputs in an intelligence analytic and creation 
environment.  
6 
A given set of information is relevant to the thesis if it supports the overarching 
goal of understanding the cultural context of this thesis and the goal of assessing, 
selecting, and combining best practices regarding crowd-and prediction markets-based 
techniques into an overall methodology for the Intelligence Community to use to improve 
its intelligence forecasts. The goal is not to create new methodologies for each crowd- 
and prediction market-based technique; rather, the end state involves synthesizing 
existing best practices in the design, implementation, and operation of each technique 
with an understanding of Intelligence Community culture in a novel way to create a more 
accurate combined forecasting methodology. 
3. Study Limitations and Scope 
Intelligence forecasts and other predictions supporting, affecting, or affected by 
national policy are the boundaries of the types of forecasts this thesis considers. 
Qualitative analyses of Intelligence Community culture and its implications for 
intelligence analysis form another boundary of the thesis scope. Commonly accepted 
design methodologies for prediction markets and crowdsourcing efforts form the 
remaining boundaries of this thesis scope. All other contexts and forecasting techniques 
are out of scope by design. Additionally, the scope of this thesis specifically excludes 
other forecasting methodologies, such as quantitative and qualitative modeling, polling, 
social network analysis-based forecasting, big data-based forecasting, or any technique 
not previously cited. Finally, this thesis proposes evaluation criteria and potential tests of 
the methodology but does not actually test the methodology.  
4. Data Sources and Evidence 
The thesis consults the rich existing literature produced in both academic and non-
academic contexts on Intelligence Community products, processes, culture, and 
prediction markets, and crowdsourcing. Finally, this thesis uses only open-source 
information on Intelligence Community processes, products, and accuracy as closed-
source information sources are inaccessible. 
7 
5. Preview of Thesis Findings 
The thesis finds that the key characteristics of Intelligence Community culture 
that may drive forecast inaccuracy or indeed even forecasting failure will likely have 
minimal impact when using crowd-or prediction markets-based forecasting techniques. 
This low impact results from how those Intelligence Community cultural characteristics 
manifest themselves in the traditional analytic process. Indeed, by applying best practices 
for the proposed crowd- or prediction markets-based methodologies, it is possible to use 
these very cultural characteristics to drive improved analysis and forecast accuracy 
instead.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis develops a practical, actionable, and testable crowd-based 
methodology to improve the accuracy, applicability, and utility of intelligence analysis 
through: 
• a literature review (Chapter II) 
• a discussion of relevant practices in crowdsourcing and prediction markets 
design, implementation, and operation (Chapters III and IV, respectively) 
• a discussion of the implications of Intelligence Community culture for 
crowd sourced and prediction markets-based forecasting techniques 
(Chapter V) 
• a proposed forecasting methodology (Chapter VI)  
• a discussion of the implementation and testing of the proposed forecasting 
methodology and of areas for subsequent research (Chapter VII) 
  
8 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The starting point for this thesis is a review of academic and nonacademic 
literature on:  
• key characteristics of the Intelligence Community, its culture, its work 
process, and work products, including an assessment of why it is unique 
compared to other analytic contexts, such as business intelligence or 
academic analysis 
• combination of forecasts to improve forecast accuracy 
• utility of prediction markets in improving forecast accuracy  
• utility of crowdsourcing intelligence in improving forecast accuracy 
This thesis excludes quantitative probabilistic assessments, quantitative and 
qualitative models, and polls-based techniques from further consideration because 
extensive work on utilizing these techniques in an intelligence context has already been 
conducted. The lack of available relevant information in the case of closed source 
information led to its exclusion from consideration as well.  
A. INTELLIGENCE CULTURE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR ANALYSIS 
The emphasis on Intelligence Community culture in this thesis is deliberate and 
results from a review of the literature on Intelligence Community culture, processes, and 
products. The proposed methodology developed in this thesis seeks to improve 
forecasting by taking advantage of the very cultural characteristics problematic in 
traditional intelligence analysis as cited in the literature. These characteristics include 
problems related to:  
• the driving need for consensus coupled with a bias against sharing 
information 
10 
• an emphasis on tradecraft leading to a notion that intelligence analysis is 
impervious to understanding based on the scientific method  
• inappropriate ways of developing and assessing expertise that lead to 
analytic sclerosis 
• cognitive biases distorting analysis 
• time constraints resulting in a focus on the short term 
• the focus on current production resulting in inappropriate levels of validity 
testing and a focus on quantity not quality 
• the impact of analysts’ rewards and incentives being tied to quantity of 
production and social standing  
• the impact of norms, taboos, and secrecy leading to an inability of analysts 
to challenge accepted judgment and leading to a belief that secret 
information is of higher quality than other information  
• the impact of analysts’ training that results in a lack of a coherent 
professional identity  
These negative cultural characteristics affect forecast accuracy, forecast 
applicability, and forecast utility of forecasts resulting from traditional Intelligence 
Community analysis. The salience of culture to forecast accuracy is substantiated in other 
non-intelligence contexts by the literature on organizational behavior and change.7  
                                                 
7 Susan Cartwright and Cary L. Cooper, “The Role of Culture Compatibility in Successful 
Organizational Marriage,” The Academy of Management Executive (1993–2005) 7, no. 2 (May 1993): 57–
70.  
11 
1. Culture, Intelligence, and the Intelligence Community 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines culture as the “philosophy, practices, and 
attitudes of an institution, business, or other organization.”8 The U.S. Intelligence 
Community has its own unique culture, founded in the notions of intelligence 
exceptionalism articulated by Turner.9 Intelligence exceptionalism is the idea that 
intelligence and intelligence forecasting and analysis as practiced by the Intelligence 
Community have unique characteristics that set them apart from other types of 
forecasting and analysis. Indeed, it can also be argued that the negative cultural 
characteristics problematic in traditional intelligence analysis and previously cited are 
additional sources of intelligence exceptionalism.  
Culturally, fields, such as business intelligence, business forecasting, 
epidemiological intelligence and forecasting, political analysis, market intelligence and 
forecasting, election forecasting and the like, are seemingly analogous to intelligence 
analysis in terms of the types of required analysis and the level of consequence of 
analytic and forecasting failure. However, they are not considered true analogues to 
intelligence analysis by the Intelligence Community itself. Indeed, “intelligence culture 
may be regarded as the ideas, responses and behaviors acquired by intelligence 
communities and conditioned by history and geography.”10 It is distinct from other 
organizational cultures based on “ideas of secrecy and the provision of accurate, timely 
and relevant intelligence,”11 whereas intelligence is defined as “knowledge…the kind of 
knowledge our state must possess regarding other states in order to assure itself that its 
cause nor its undertakings fail because its statesmen and soldiers plan and act in 
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ignorance.”12 Note that intelligence is not confined to activities bound together by 
secrecy. Sims updates this idea of what intelligence is when she states:  
Intelligence is best defined as information collected, organized or analyzed 
on behalf of actors or decision makers… (intelligence) may be collected 
from open (newspapers, books, radio and television), clandestine (national 
technical means, agents) and “gray” sources [which] include private 
citizens or companies willing to divulge information during private 
conversation.13  
Lowenthal refines Sims’s definition of intelligence when he states, “intelligence is 
the process by which specific types of information important to national security are 
requested, analyzed and provided to policy makers.”14 By necessity, this understanding 
of what intelligence is requires that the cultural focus of the Intelligence Community be 
on delivering analytic products based upon skilled intellectual effort applied to all manner 
of information. These products need to have relevance for decision makers, defined as 
accuracy, utility, and applicability.15 Furthermore, the creation of intelligence products 
requires that analysts make decisions in a harsh, unforgiving environment with severe 
consequences for failure.  
Intelligence analysts usually make forecasts based on a significantly incomplete 
and vague set of facts. The accuracy of the facts is indeterminate, and limited feedback is 
available to refine the analysts’ judgments, which amplifies the notion that intelligence 
and intelligence analysis are indeed exceptional. It also implies that intelligence and 
intelligence analysis is more consequential than other forms of analysis.  
When coupled with historical Intelligence Community strategic cultural factors 
extant since during the Cold War, this understanding of intelligence and intelligence 
work products suggests that the intelligence culture is the preeminent driver of 
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Intelligence Community success or failure in making robust estimates and predictions.16 
The relevant historical strategic cultural factors include:  
• a tendency that emerged during the Cold War to oversimplify threats.17  
• an Intelligence Community work product becoming consensus oriented as 
a matter of political expediency, which leads to a preference for a “group 
mindset” or “herd mentality” in the preparation of Intelligence 
Community estimates.18  
• an increasingly risk averse culture when it comes to estimates so that 
making or advancing a position that contradicts or challenges the accepted 
wisdom of the Intelligence Community even when such challenges come 
from consumers of intelligence at the highest levels is increasingly 
unlikely.19  
• an adherence to the rational actor theory.20  
• an attitude toward gaps in knowledge that can be summarized in the adage 
“if you don’t know the facts, then make the best educated guess you can 
rather than admit that you don’t know.”21  
• an insistence on the part of every director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency and now the Director of National Intelligence that they have 
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18 Aid, 480. 
19 Aid, 483. 
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unfettered access to the president with all the corresponding implications 
for the politicization of intelligence.22  
This list of strategic cultural factors can be mapped to the negative Intelligence 
Community cultural characteristics affecting forecast accuracy, forecast applicability, and 
forecast utility mentioned previously and discussed in detail as follows. Indeed, these 
overarching historical strategic cultural factors are still in play today and when coupled 
with more granular cultural aspects of the Intelligence Community and its processes 
(discussed in later sections), they require any proposed Intelligence Community analytic 
methodology to make cultural compatibility central to its design. The notion of the 
centrality of culture to effective intelligence analysis is supported by the literature.23 This 
assertion is substantiated in other non-intelligence contexts by the literature on 
organizational behavior and change.24  
2. The Twin Problems of Consensus and of Information Sharing in 
Intelligence Community Culture 
The Intelligence Community consists of a myriad of players, and all have their 
own unique (cultural) perceptions of what intelligence is and how analysis should be 
performed. To quote Boardman in his 2006 thesis, “Overcoming the organizational 
cultures of multiple, disparate agencies, departments and organizations is critical to 
solving the problem of sharing information and intelligence such that it may be analyzed 
and utilized by the people who need it.”25 
Given the costs and benefits of reaching consensus on analytic processes and 
results, each player in the community will likely be biased toward either jockeying for 
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primacy to the detriment of collegiality and consensus or toward the lowest common 
denominator between alternative analytic results. As Lowenthal explains, “the 
interagency process requires bargaining and negotiation…that requires a great deal of 
time… [and] gives leverage to an agency that refuses to reach agreement… [and] 
generates substantial pressure in favor of the lowest common denominator.”26 George’s 
description of the underpinnings of why this situation occurs is on point when he states, 
“The [individual] analyst… is likely to believe that his organization’s view should 
prevail, in part to reflect the primacy of that office in following the topic in question.”27 
This phenomenon is called “tribal think” by Central Intelligence Agency tradecraft expert 
Jack Davis, and it reflects each agency’s cultural imperative to preserve its prevailing 
paradigm and tamp down deviant views to maintain its position as primus inter pares.28 
Furthermore, the Intelligence Community is not a monolithic agency. When it 
comes to information sharing, each entity within the community has its own distinct 
culture. However, some common threads persist, including:  
• the practice of limited information distribution and existing extensive 
compartmentalization practices29 
• a “need to know” as the basis for information sharing within and outside 
the Intelligence Community, which by its very nature limits what 
information is shared and when and how it is shared30  
• the view that information is a source of power31 
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• the fact that expansion of the pool of those who “need to know” is 
difficult32 
Furthermore, information sharing between agencies is not as prevalent as it should 
be for cultural reasons. As Maras explains: 
Existing organizational cultures in the IC require and encourage secrecy 
by stressing the necessity to protect their information and clandestine 
activities. Limited disclosure and secrecy are thus key aspects of IC 
processes and practices. This leads to limited information sharing... The 
missions of these agencies [Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central 
Intelligence Agency, Director of National Intelligence] place them as 
primary agencies in protecting the United States by engaging in some 
form of intelligence function. The sharing of information is not explicit or 
implicit in their missions.33  
3. Cultural Issues with the Intelligence Analytic Process 
The intelligence analytic process itself is subject to intelligence exceptionalism 
when it comes to culture. The author’s research and analysis suggests that the primary 
manifestation is seen in the emphasis on tradecraft to the detriment of more scientific 
analytic methods and unique problems related to the role of experts and expertise. Even 
when creating and using scientific and technical intelligence or using precision 
measurement techniques, the Intelligence Community nonetheless relies on idiosyncratic 
processes to deal with gaps in knowledge or uncertainty. Other less important sources of 
exceptionalism include unique versions of cognitive bias, such as confirmation bias. 
According to Hare and Collinson, “extreme time constraints; focus on current production; 
the rewards and incentives”34 for analysts; norms, taboos, and the impact of secrecy; and 
finally, the analyst’s identity and training. As discussed in the next section, each of these 
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cultural sources of intelligence exceptionalism may have negative consequences for 
intelligence analysis in general and forecast accuracy in particular.  
a. The Impact of the Emphasis on Tradecraft on Intelligence Community 
Analysis 
According to Johnston, an explicit cultural emphasis on treating analysis and the 
analytic process as tradecraft across the Intelligence Community seems to be evident.35 
Treating analysis and the analytic process as tradecraft implies that analysis is an 
idiosyncratic process, a black art unknowable to all except to those who have received 
wisdom from those on the inside. Its implications are:  
• The analysis and the analytic process cannot be approached using the rigor 
of the scientific method.  
• The success or failure of the analytic process depends on an intuitive 
understanding derived from received wisdom coupled with experience and 
thus cannot be imparted in its most nuanced sense through training.  
• The methods and techniques of intelligence analysis are unique, are 
characterized by being unverifiable, and are unexplainable in some sense.  
• The “good” techniques are simply those that have survived through time 
and are handed down from senior analysts to junior analysts, while lacking 
comparatively rigorous, testable definitions of what these “good” 
techniques are.  
• The skills of anomaly detection, pattern recognition, and weighing data in 
terms of its relevance, accuracy, and analytic implications are gained 
through experience with minimal contributions from training and 
academic and practitioner research.  
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• The lessons learned from success or failure are unlikely to be formally 
captured; instead, they become part of the idiosyncratic lore passed from 
analyst to analyst.  
• The training process becomes subjective, which leads to inconsistencies in 
analysts’ preparation for the tasks at hand.36  
b. The Impact of the Problem of Expertise Tradecraft on Intelligence 
Community Analysis 
One common cultural factor across the intelligence community is the assessment 
of someone’s level of expertise based on recognition from policy makers for useful 
written assessments and oral briefs. The perception of success reinforces not only the 
confidence of the intelligence analysts in their expert judgment but also the confidence of 
their peers and superiors in said expert judgment. This expert judgment then drives 
Intelligence Community processes and resulting work products.37  
This factor contrasts with other fields wherein experts and expertise are defined as 
those who possess specialized knowledge in a given domain that allows them to: (1) 
recognize patterns, (2) apply higher order domain specific principles to solve problems 
more quickly than others, (3) solve problems in their domain with fewer errors than 
others, (4) possess domain specific short- and long-term memory, and (5) are better at 
self-monitoring and identifying and filling gaps in domain specific knowledge than 
others.38  
When the accuracy of known facts is indeterminate, and limited feedback is 
available to refine the analysts’ judgments, as is the case in the intelligence community, 
an analyst’s application of expert judgment usually involves the creation of a set of 
mental models based on past successes. This model results in a kind of analytic sclerosis 
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because an analyst constantly attempts to apply these pre-existing mental models to all 
situations, regardless of whether they are appropriately applied given the relevant range 
and preconditions inherent in the models. As analysts rely more and more upon their 
well-honed mental model of the characteristics and behavior of the target of the 
intelligence effort, the more likely they may miss major gaps or breaks in the continuity 
of the analysis or key changes that may have occurred in the target of the analytic effort. 
Furthermore, the way the Intelligence Community develops, recognizes, and 
relies on experts and their expertise intelligence analysis and forecasting is contradicted 
by the academic research on both experts and expertise. According to Tetlock and 
Gardner, “experts and lay people are sensitive to a range of psychological idiosyncrasies, 
subjective biases, values, and conflicts of interest.”39 Indeed, experts may know their 
specific domains but may fail at tasks that reach outside their domains, such as using an 
interdisciplinary approach to divine the intentions of an adversary. It can also be argued 
that experts may not necessarily produce the best forecasts. Indeed, Tetlock and Gardner 
have found that superforecasters are not necessarily accepted as experts in their fields.40 
More often, superforecasters are those who understand that humbleness, an awareness of 
the complexity of systems of systems, and most crucially, the ability to learn from 
mistakes are prerequisites for forecasting performance.41 
c. The Impact of Cognitive Biases and Tradecraft on Intelligence 
Community Analysis 
As George notes, “cognitive bias is inherent to the ‘cognition’ process every 
analyst uses to examine an intelligence topic.”42 In the Intelligence Community culture, 
upon gaining experience, analysts develop patterns of thinking, otherwise known as 
mindsets, which are working models of how the object of analysis works. Analysts often 
tend to search for information consistent with or that may confirm existing agency 
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consensus, or they may select the most probable point of view that is comparatively easy 
to support, which is known in other contexts as confirmation bias. This does not mean 
that analysts ignore divergent analytic opinions; however, analysts most often include 
these as footnotes and usually reflect inter- rather than intra-organizational differences. 
This search for confirmation on the part of analysts does not necessarily result from a 
conscious decision; rather:  
It is the result of accepting an existing set of hypothesis, developing a 
mental model based on previous corporate products, and then trying to 
augment that model with current data in order to support the existing 
hypothesis.43  
At the end of the day, cognitive biases can distort analysis due to mindsets and 
confirmation biases, among others, In other words, analysts may often discount or 
downgrade analyses and explanations that do not fit their pre-existing mindset or 
consensus.  
d. The Impact of Extreme Time Constraints on Intelligence Analysis 
Intelligence by its nature is time sensitive and perishable. In 2005, Johnston found 
that time is one of the greatest constraints faced by analysts. This constraint is coupled 
with the fact that the sheer volume of information (primarily open source but also gray 
information) that analysts need to integrate into analytic products results in time pressure 
on analysts that exceeds that of other intellectual endeavors. This reality is exacerbated 
by the fact that the timeframes of policy makers’ decision cycles have become shorter 
and shorter; the extreme is 24 hours or less. This short lead time leads to the timeframes 
for analysis shrinking to support the decision cycle adequately. Other intellectually 
demanding analytic endeavors, such as work on business intelligence or in medicine, face 
similar time pressures.  
When the extreme time pressure analysts face when combined with the 
consequences for the failure to deliver products on time supports the notion that time 
pressure in intelligence analytic endeavors is unique. It also results in informal and 
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formal cultural understandings of its reality and how to cope with that reality 
incorporating into intelligence culture. Indeed, this cultural reality is also driven by 
changes in the intelligence environment that have resulted in a shift toward short-term 
issues or problem solving.44 Both of these factors drive a shift in intelligence analysis 
resulting in a focus on short-term, tractable problems, and to lessened validity testing to 
the detriment of longer-term, well-tested, and nuanced analysis.  
e. The Impact of the Relentless Focus on Current Production on 
Intelligence Analysis 
The contraction of policy makers’ decision cycle, coupled with a huge increase in 
demand for Intelligence Community products, has resulted in a cultural emphasis on 
current intelligence production to the detriment of longer term or strategic analytic 
products. This phenomenon affects both groups’ interactions and the analytic process. 
Groups are often so focused on generating product that validity testing of the group 
product is less than robust, and the opinion of a single or of a few experts dominates (it is 
easier to agree to be able to return to individual tasks). In terms of the analytic process, 
useful techniques, such as Bayesian analysis, scenario development, red teams, 
simulations, competing hypotheses etc., are superficially applied or not applied at all 
because of the relentless need to generate analytic product relevant to policy maker’s 
decision cycle. Analysis of the medium- to long-term behavior of any object of 
intelligence analysis therefore gets the short shrift. As Tyakoff says, “intelligence 
agencies [are] preoccupied with quantity rather than the quality of finished 
intelligence.”45 
f. The Impact of Rewards and Incentives on Intelligence Analysis 
According to Johnston, analysts’ rewards and incentives, namely opportunities for 
promotion, are directly tied to the amount of analytic product a given analyst produces. In 
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addition, rewards and incentives most often accrue to and are a function of the analysts 
social capital (in terms of their peers and their reputation with policy makers), as well as 
the level of their influence within the Intelligence Community.46 Not ultimately a bad 
thing when assuming that social capital and influence derive from analytic excellence. 
However, the seeming lack of rigorous backward looking (quantitative not qualitative) 
analysis of the accuracy and relevance of analytic work product is a significant weakness, 
as analysts’ rewards and incentives are not tied to analytic accuracy and relevance.  
g. The Impact of Norms and Taboos and Secrecy on Intelligence Analysis 
Norms and taboos are also essential features of the Intelligence Community 
culture. First among these is the cultural taboo against taking action that goes against the 
maintenance of the current set of institutional judgments. According to Johnston, “Once 
any intelligence agency has given its official opinion to policy makers, there exists a 
taboo about reversing or significantly changing the official or corporate position in order 
to avoid the loss of status, trust or respect.”47 This tendency is reinforced by perceptions 
of policy makers, or the perception that changing the official line, even when such actions 
result from new information, is a manifestation of incompetence or poor performance on 
the part of the agency. For the agency, the threat of loss of status, funding, or access also 
accompanies this scenario. Additionally, this threat also directly leads to a cultural norm 
that requires that the agency’s analytic products be decisive regardless of circumstance—
as opposed to nuanced, academic, and contradictory products—and results in analysts 
reworking analysis to be consistent with the requirements of this norm. Another cultural 
norm relates to the level of secrecy associated with inputs to the analysis. Analysts in the 
Intelligence Community perceive secret data collected by covert means to have a much 
greater analytic value than open source or “gray” information. The analysts test the 
validity of their cognitive model with secret information and use open source or gray 
information to fill gaps or provide context; indeed, the understanding is more covert 
information used in the analysis the better. According to the Commission on the 
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Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
“Regrettably, all too frequently… ‘non-secret’ sources are undervalued and underused by 
the Intelligence Community.”48 These cultural factors have the following consequences 
for intelligence analysts and their analysis: (1) changing, reversing, or otherwise straying 
from the agency position, regardless of new or even contradictory information, is highly 
discouraged, (2) analytic products are generally decisive in nature regardless of whether 
that decisiveness is justified by circumstance, and (3) non-secret sources of information 
are systematically undervalued. 
h. The Impact of the Analysts’ Identity and Training on Intelligence 
Analysis 
Johnston found that analysts’ identities revolve around the organization’s function 
or around their own education and background as opposed to revolving around a coherent 
intelligence analytic culture that treats intelligence analysis as a unique professional 
endeavor. He also found that their professional identity is more associated with reportage 
as opposed to being associated with analysis.49 This association is driven by the 
perceived shift from medium- to long-term analysis to short-term, tactical analytic 
efforts. The implication is that analysts in the Intelligence Community lack a coherent 
commonly held professional identity. This lack of identity, and thus a common frame, has 
negative implications for group cohesion, inter- and intra-agency interaction and 
relationships. 
In theory, developing intelligence analysts’ skills for making forecasts requires 
that the analysts engage in high levels of effort, gain rewards for experience, and engage 
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in organized training over time.50 Many agencies provide basic and advanced training 
but usually do so independently. Intelligence Community-wide training opportunities are 
limited, which leads to fragmentation in terms of analytic approaches by analysts in 
different agencies. Although norms and standards for analysis do exist within the 
Intelligence Community, the details of how agencies operationalize these norms and 
standards vary from agency to agency.51  
The implications of these cultural factors for intelligence and intelligence analysis 
include: (1) an emphasis on reportage rather than analysis in Intelligence Community 
products, (2) a lack of a coherent approach to intelligence analysis driven by fragmented 
training of analysts and inconsistent implementation of intelligence analytic norms and 
standards, and (3) fragmentation in analytic approaches within particular stovepipes 
within an agency (technical, tactical, operational, etc.) to the detriment of broader, 
integrative skill sets. All this fragmentation also means that analysts from different 
agencies often have difficulty finding, communicating with, and otherwise interacting 
with analysts outside their parochial purview, which results in all the ensuing 
consequences in terms of a lack analytic cohesion and conflict during the interagency 
process. 
B. WHY COMBINE FORECASTS? 
Although agencies in the Intelligence Community do not seem to combine 
forecasts across agencies, a number of sources in the literature favor this practice because 
it increases accuracy. For example, according to Brown and Murphy, “Combining 
forecasts can improve forecasting performance when one set of forecasts contains 
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information…not contained in the other set of forecasts.”52 Similarly in 
Superforecasters, Tetlock and Gardner note forecasts about future events based on 
combining the forecasts of the most accurate lay predictors turned out to be more 
accurate than those of trained Intelligence Community analysts.53 The literature on 
improving forecasting suggests that the forecast accuracy of the Intelligence Community 
work product can be significantly improved by combining independent forecasts. The 
next section discusses empirical demonstrations of the increase in accuracy engendered 
by combining independent forecasts, as well as the implications of using combined 
forecasts. 
Armstrong summarizes the results of extensive empirical research on combining 
forecasts (he includes all types of forecasts, including those for natural events, in his 
studies) and builds on Clemen’s seminal work, which reviewed 209 papers on this topic, 
by reviewing an additional 57 relevant empirical studies.54 As Armstrong describes:  
Compared to the typical component forecast, the combined forecast is 
never less accurate. Usually it is much more accurate, with error 
reductions in the MAPE [mean absolute percentage error, also known as 
mean absolute percentage deviation, is a measure of prediction accuracy 
of a forecasting method in statistics] running over 12 percent for the 30 
comparisons reviewed. Under ideal conditions (high uncertainty and 
combining many valid forecasts), the error reductions sometimes exceeded 
20%. Also under ideal conditions, the combined forecasts were often more 
accurate than the best of the components. In short, the combined forecast 
can be better than the best but no worse than the average.55 
The appendix contains a table providing a summary of the mean error reductions 
due to combing forecasts across 30 studies that Armstrong reviewed. Armstrong goes on 
to provide “rules of the road” for combing forecasts, namely: 
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• key principles for combining forecasts are to use  
• different methods or data or both  
• forecasts from at least five methods when possible;  
• formal procedures for combining, which are  
• equal weights when facing high uncertainty 
• trimmed means  
• weights based on evidence of prior accuracy  
• weights based on track records, if the evidence is strong, and 
weights based on good domain knowledge56 
Combining forecasts is most useful with:  
• uncertainty as to the selection of the most accurate forecasting method  
• uncertainty associated with the forecasting situation.  
• high cost for large forecast errors57 
More recently, Graefe et al. have found that combining forecasts based on many 
types of underlying data significantly improved forecasts of how the share of the 
nationwide popular vote for president was distributed. They state, “Combining [forecasts] 
yielded error reductions ranging from 16 percent to 59 percent, compared to the average 
errors of the individual forecasts.”58 This suggestion is amplified by Rothschild in the 
context of election forecasts.59  
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The literature strongly suggests that combining independent forecasts generally 
improves forecast accuracy. This thesis proposes combining forecasts from two 
independent sources, namely crowd based forecasts and prediction markets based 
forecasts, to improve intelligence forecast accuracy. The independent forecasts can be 
combined in a manner consistent with the principles for improving forecast accuracy 
discussed previously.  
C. PREDICTION MARKETS BASICS  
Friedrich Hayek elucidated the theory behind prediction markets in his 1945 study 
on the use of knowledge in society.60 The following works elaborate on arguments for 
the utility and accuracy of prediction markets when making forecasts. Refer to 
Surowiecki’s 2004 book, The Wisdom of Crowds, Sunstein’s 2006 book, Infotopia, and 
Hubbard’s 2014 book, How to Measure Anything: Finding the Value of Intangibles.61 
The efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) forms the theoretical basis for the demonstrated 
ability of the prediction market to make accurate predictions. According to the EMH, in a 
financial market, asset prices fully reflect all publicly available information and instantly 
change to reflect new public information.62 Furthermore, as Fama noted in a 1969 article, 
“the EMH claims that asset prices reflect even hidden ‘insider’ information.”63  
Since they provide a mechanism to put a price on an outcome (asset), prediction 
markets are analogous to financial markets. A prediction market can be defined as an 
exchange-traded market in which participants buy and sell assets that embody the 
outcome of events. The evolution of the price of the asset until the event actually occurs, 
or when the asset contract expires, reflects the instantaneous likelihood of the event 
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occurring as assessed at that point in time. Prediction markets participants are in essence 
buying an asset whose price varies between $0.00 (no likelihood of the event occurring) 
to $1 (the event is a certainty; a 100 percent chance of the event occurring) at expiry 
(when it is possible to determine if the event has occurred or not). As participants buy 
and sell the asset over time, its price varies as a function of supply and demand. The 
evolution of the price of the asset before expiry reflects the instantaneous likelihood of 
the event occurring as assessed at that point in time. Prediction market participants can 
also short the asset, essentially making a bet that the price of the asset will decrease. 
Shorting involves the sale of a security not owned by the seller but is promised to be 
delivered in the future. In other words, the sellers are making a bet that the price of the 
asset will go down because they will be able to obtain the stock at a future date at a lower 
price so as to fulfill the delivery contract and make a profit. If the price of the asset goes 
up in the future instead, then the short seller will fulfill the contract at a loss. The 
opposite of shorting is going long; purchasing the asset in the hope that the value of the 
stock will go up in the future. The success or failure of the participants in predicting 
whether the event has occurred is given by the value of the participant’s prediction 
market portfolio at expiry. 
D. PREDICTION MARKETS AND FORECAST ACCURACY  
The primary reason for the choice of prediction markets as one of the techniques 
for improving intelligence analysis is the potential for improved forecast accuracy. 
Indeed, in the past five years, the Intelligence Community has started to explore the 
potential of prediction markets-based techniques to improve its understanding of the 
timing, type, and qualitative and quantitative characteristics of events of interest to policy 
makers; chiefly, intelligence analysis. The body of literature supports the assertion that 
prediction market-based forecasts are highly accurate in a variety of contexts, such as 
higher than polls and other techniques. Prediction markets did fail to predict the election 
of President Trump, as well as the vote affirming the exit of Britain from the European 
Union (Brexit); however, contemporaneous news accounts do provide plausible 
explanations for these failures.  
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Studies on the accuracy of prediction market forecasts under different scenarios 
have found prediction markets make accurate forecasts of events under a wide variety of 
conditions.64 The literature evaluating the accuracy of prediction markets assumes that 
each individual participating in the prediction market is unbiased and makes forecasts 
independent of the forecasts of other market participants. Under these assumptions, the 
aggregated forecast of the group of market participants is uncontroversially better on 
average than the forecasts made by each individual.65 However, the limits of the crowd’s 
participating in prediction markets’ wisdom are comparatively poorly understood. For 
example, when group members can compare their predictions to those of other group 
members, positive correlations between predictions may be expected, which can result in 
a decline in the group’s predictive performance; however, research has shown this 
assumption is not the case.66  
Consider the case of sports betting as a prediction market. In sports betting, 
individuals seem to make systematically biased predictions, and thus, their predictions 
are strongly correlated. As a result, the accuracy of sports bettors’ forecasts in the 
aggregate can be expected to be reduced compared with those made using other 
techniques. That is, their predictions are less wise.67 Dana and Broomell analyze the 
robustness of crowd wisdom in the face of varying factors, such as bias and diversity or 
lack thereof, and they find that “a group is wisest, all things equal, when it is maximally 
‘diverse’ in that its members’ forecasts are as negatively correlated as possible.”68 Dana 
and Broomell also state that wise groups should include some members who are better 
                                                 
64 Arrow et al., “The Promise of Prediction Markets,” 877–878; Berg, Nelson, and Rietz, “Prediction 
Market Accuracy in the Long Run,” 285–300. 
65 Armstrong, “Combining Forecasts,” 417–439; Clemen, “Combining Forecasts,” 559–583; Robert I. 
Winkler, “Probabilistic Prediction: Some Experimental Results,” Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 66, no. 336 (1971): 675–685.  
66 Jan Lorenz et al., “How Social Influence Can Undermine the Wisdom of Crowd Effect,” 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108, no. 22 (2001): 9020–9025.  
67 Joseph P. Simmons et al., “Intuitive Biases in Choice versus Estimation: Implications for the 
Wisdom of Crowds,” Journal of Consumer Research 38, no. 1 (June 2011): 1–15.  
68 Clintin P. Davis-Stober et al., “When Is a Crowd Wise?,” Decision 1, no. 2 (2014): 79–101.  
30 
predictors than the norm and that a diversity of market participants’ perspectives is 
critical to the market’s predictive accuracy.69  
Studies of the accuracy of prediction markets under different conditions appear 
extensively in the literature, and they have been found to be quite accurate in predicting 
events in a wide variety of situations.70 For example, according to Lin, Tung, and Yeh in 
a 2013 article, “prediction markets have been proven empirically to be remarkably 
accurate in forecasting future events with a lower prediction error than conventional 
forecasting methods ex post.”71 Additionally, Berg, Nelson, and Rietz found that when 
comparing the predictions of polls with those of prediction markets in the U.S. 
presidential elections from 1998 to 2004, the predictions of prediction markets were 
closer to the eventual outcome than traditional polls 74 percent of the time.72 Williams 
and Reade support this assertion when they determined that they could “conclude that 
prediction markets appear to provide the most precise forecasts” when compared to polls, 
expert opinion, and statistical modeling.73  
Rajakovich and Vladimirov found another example of the effectiveness of 
prediction markets; they found that when predicting the number of admissions in a health 
care setting, the prediction of the market participants was 1,158 admissions while the 
actual number of admittances was 1,154, an error of only 0.3 percent.74 In a pilot study 
using prediction markets for forecasting influenza activities in Iowa, North Carolina, and 
Nebraska in the 2008–2009 and 2009–2010 influenza seasons, Ho, Polgreen, and 
Prendergast found, “prediction markets achieved high level of forecasting accuracy, 
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provide a flexible and effective way to aggregate both objective and subjective 
information about seasonal influenza.”75 In 2014, Arneson and Bergfjord found that 
prediction markets outperformed the polls in predicting the outcomes of the 2008 and 
2012 U.S. elections.76 In 2009, Berg, Neuman, and Rietz used a prediction market to 
estimate Google’s initial public offering (IPO) price and found that the prediction market 
results accurately tracked both the level of IPO oversubscription and Google’s first day 
market capitalization.77  
According to Slamka, Skiera, and Spann, “Prediction market accuracy depends on 
its market design, including the choice of market mechanism.”78 Additionally, Gaspoz 
provides key and comprehensive information on the various factors to consider when 
designing prediction markets that includes the details of alternative incentive 
mechanisms, trading processes, clearinghouse parameters, and participant management 
options.79 Li, Chen-Yuan, and Chang summarize the impact of design factors on 
prediction market accuracy, as found in the literature when they explain that:  
Some scholars (e.g., Berg et al., 1997; Gruca et al., 2005) assert, based on 
trading data of Iowa electronic markets (IEMs), that number of contracts 
(degree of competition), trading volume and bid-ask price spread are the 
most important factors. Others (e.g., Forsythe et al., 1999; Oliven and 
Rietz, 2004) find that number of marginal traders is the major factor for 
prediction accuracy. Kambil and Heck (2002) and Ledyard (2006) 
advocate that major factors include large number of traders, sufficient 
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information as well as incentives for traders to reveal effective 
information.80 
Thus far, public prediction markets have been considered. Corporations have used 
and also currently use private prediction markets. By overarching objective, these private 
markets include: (1) forecasting markets, (2) markets that revolve around idea genesis 
and evaluation, and (3) markets that address the problem of innovation by matching 
research and development problems with researchers and peer-to-peer assistance. 
In 2007, Gruca and Berg showed how private prediction markets could be used to 
tap into private information and unstated knowledge held by stakeholders, such as 
employees, customers, vendors, etc.81 In this vein, data from Google concerning its 
corporate prediction markets suggests that event probabilities predicted by its markets 
closely approximated actual event probabilities.82 This data is especially impressive 
when considering that it covered 2.5 years during which Google ran 270 prediction 
markets with over 1,400 participants.83 Hewlett Packard attempted to use prediction 
markets to estimate future sales and found that the forecasts generated as a result were 
more accurate than those generated using traditional forecasting processes.84 
Comparably, Intel found that its internal prediction market forecasts were at a minimum 
as accurate as its official forecasts produced using conventional methods, and in some 
cases, they were as much as 20 percent more accurate.85 Davis used an internal 
prediction market to estimate the cost and schedule performance of Department of 
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Defense acquisition programs (each program cost and schedule estimate was an asset 
traded in the prediction market).86 In a 2011 article, Davis states, “The market was open 
for 117 days. Within two weeks of opening, on average, the market converged to the right 
answer [correct estimate of cost and/or schedule slip] for nine [out of 10] assets.”87 
Similarly, Buckley reports that some other organizations that have used prediction 
markets to aid in decision-making include Motorola, Qualcomm, InfoWorld, MGM, 
Chiron Corporation, TNT, EA Games, Yahoo, Corning, MasterFoods, Pfizer, Abbott, 
Chrysler, General Mills, and O’Reilly Media.88 
Dissenting voices about the predictive superiority of prediction markets in making 
forecasts include Graefe et al., Sjoberg, and Teschner and Weinhardt. Graefe et al. 
discovered, “prediction markets provided little additional value compared to a simple 
average of forecasts” when performing a simple quantitative judgment task.89 Sjoberg 
looked at multiple different groups of forecasters and forecasts for Swedish elections and 
did not find evidence of prediction markets generating superior forecasts.90 Additionally, 
Teschner and Weinhardt looked at multiple studies on the use of comparing prediction 
markets to surveys and polls and found that their review “suggests that the relative 
performance advantage of markets may be small compared to surveys or polls.”91  
Furthermore, recent prediction market failures, such as the failure to predict the 
election of Donald Trump and Brexit accurately, have thrown the claims of prediction 
market evangelists in doubt. A 2016 article by Kominers in Bloomberg View provides a 
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plausible explanation for these failures.92 In most prediction markets, Trump was 
consistently trading below 35 cents in the month prior to the election with an average 
daily closing price around 25 cents, which suggests a 25 percent probability of victory. 
However, he still had a one in four chance of winning, so his win while improbable, 
should have happened on average one in four times. For Brexit, the odds of a yes vote 
were about at around three in 10 in the major prediction markets, so the joint probability 
of both a Trump victory and Brexit was likely around 7.5 percent. Yet, both happened. 
An explanation may be that most people betting on prediction markets do not have much 
contact with the people who voted for Trump and Brexit. If so, no prediction market is 
likely to give accurate results. If all the traders in the relevant prediction markets are 
missing a key piece of information, then the market price (remember the conditions for 
EMH) are likely missing it as well. Even if the market worked as designed, traders 
leaning toward Trump or Brexit may not have been participating in the market. Thus, it is 
likely none of the market participants had decent information on the scale of Trump’s or 
Brexit’s support, and all the trading in the world could not lead to a price that correctly 
reflected his chance of victory. In his 2016 Bloomberg View article, Kominers comments:  
This problem is compounded by the fact that prediction market 
participants also infer information from the prevailing price—and so may 
have discounted the signals of Trump’s strength that they did receive. 
Also, total payouts from prediction markets are too low to create a strong 
incentive for participants to work really hard to become substantially 
better-informed. This chain of logic suggests that prediction markets could 
be abnormally bad at forecasting events that will be decided by actions of 
people who aren’t themselves plugged in to prediction markets. And 
there’s a message here about markets more broadly: Even the best-
functioning markets don’t do a good job of pricing when key players 
aren’t represented.93  
Finally, the issue of manipulation of prediction markets must be addressed. 
According to Teschner and Weinhardt, “three types of manipulation [may exist]: action-
based (changing the underlying fundamentals), information-based (spreading false 
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information)”and trade-based (buying, selling of shares).”94 In all these cases, it can be 
argued that the potential offending manipulator is just another trader. If traders other than 
the manipulator take advantage of the likely ability to profit from the offending trader’s 
actions, counterintuitively market accuracy may increase. The prevailing opinion in the 
literature is summarized by Deck, Lin, and Porter in their 2013 review of studies on 
manipulating prediction markets in which they state, “Research suggests prediction 
markets are robust to manipulation attacks.”95 
The literature also contains good descriptions of the operation and theoretical 
basis for prediction markets, as well as evidence and analysis comparing and evaluating 
alternative prediction market designs. Most sources suggest the centrality of prediction 
market design to its forecasting accuracy. These design issues include “the choice of 
participants, the specification of the contracts traded in a prediction market, the trading 
mechanism, and the incentives provided to ensure information revelation, trader pool 
size, market termination timing, decision heuristics, market context, and uncertainty.”96 
Finally, the literature does include some evidence of the Intelligence Community, 
including the IARPA Aggregative Contingent Estimating ACE program, using prediction 
markets in forecasting.97 
As the literature demonstrates, prediction markets have greater forecasting 
prowess than other forecasting techniques. Although prediction markets have failed to 
live up to their promise of increased forecast accuracy in some instances, these failures 
most likely resulted due to specific design and participation factors unique to the 
particular markets in question. Prediction markets, if properly designed and implemented, 
can be a useful, practical part of the intelligence analysts’ analytic toolkit. 
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A review of the literature provides the basis for asserting that prediction markets 
may offer increased forecast accuracy. Indeed, multiple sources suggest that prediction 
markets significantly outperform more traditional forecasting techniques when 
concerning forecast accuracy. Furthermore, the salience of prediction markets design, 
levels, and types of participation to predictions markets forecasting success is clear. The 
literature includes multiple avenues for further inquiry, as well as multiple case studies of 
prediction markets-based solutions to real-world forecasting problems in business, 
politics, marketing, and funding innovation. Studies examining the effectiveness of 
prediction markets in solving intelligence problems are limited in scope and number, 
however.  
E. CROWDSOURCING BASICS 
The definition of crowdsourcing depends on who describes it. For instance, Doan, 
Ramakrishnan, and Halevy describe crowdsourcing as a system that “enlists a crowd of 
humans to help solve a problem defined by the system owners.”98 Nakatsu, Grossman, 
and Iacovu view certain types of peer production, such as open-source software 
development, as forms of crowdsourcing. They posit, “crowdsourcing is outsourcing to 
an undefined, anonymous group of people who come together to solve problems and 
perform tasks once performed by a company’s employees.”99 Nakatsu, Grossman, and 
Iacovu expand their definition and define crowdsourcing as a four-step process in which: 
• A requestor (either an individual or organization) identifies a specific task 
to be performed or problem to be solved. 
• The requestor broadcasts the task or problem online. 
• The crowd performs the task or solves the problem. 
• Depending on the nature of the task, the requestor either 
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• Sifts through the solutions and selects the best solution (selective 
crowdsourcing).  
• Aggregates or synthesizes the crowd’s submissions in a 
meaningful way (integrative crowdsourcing).100 
In yet another definition of crowdsourcing, Morschheuser et al. explain 
“crowdsourcing can be seen as an online, distributed problem-solving approach that 
transforms problems and tasks into solutions by harnessing the potential of large groups 
of crowdsourcees via the Web rather than traditional employees or suppliers.”101 The 
importance and applicability of crowdsourcing as a technique to solve a wide variety of 
problems can be inferred from the fact that, according to Morschheuser et al., the industry 
portal crowdurcing.org provides access to information on almost 3,000 crowdsourcing 
efforts.102  
Crowdsourcing systems come in four broad categories based on the characteristics 
of the crowdsourced work being performed, as Morschheuser et al. define: 
• Crowdprocessing systems focus on using the crowd to perform large 
quantities of identical tasks. Crowdprocessing is the objective of 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk or of Galaxy Zoo.  
• Crowdsolving involves using the crowd’s diversity to find a huge number 
of solutions to a given problem, each with different characteristics. 
Crowdsolving is often used for extremely computationally intractable 
problems like protein folding or if the problem has no theoretical solution.  
• Crowdrating seeks to harness crowd wisdom to perform collective 
assessments or predictions.  
• Crowdcreating uses crowds to find solutions to create new things based on 
a variety of contributions that are different in scope or type. Examples of 
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crowdcreating include all user generated content on sites like YouTube, 
Wikipedia, and the like.103 
While crowdsolving and crowdrating can be used to provide information about 
complex problems to decision makers, this thesis focuses on crowdsolving and 
crowdrating. Simon suggests that the decision maker goes through three steps before 
coming to a decision, all of which the crowd can address. These steps are:  
Intelligence (information gathering and sharing for the purpose of problem 
solving or opportunity exploitation, problem identification, and the 
determination of the problem’s importance), design (generating ideas and 
alternative solutions), and choice (evaluating the generated alternatives 
and then recommending or selecting the best course of action).104 
In the intelligence phase of a crowdsourced effort, crowdsourcing can help search 
for, discover, and aggregate information, gather opinions, make predictions, and 
accumulate knowledge. In the design phase, crowds can solicit and elicit ideas from 
employees, customers, and other stakeholders and generate ideas. Simply, crowdsourcees 
can help generate and evaluate alternatives. 
Stottelemyre states that crowdsourced intelligence requires that (1) someone acts 
on the behalf of a national security organization, (2) someone acquires, not collects, the 
relevant information, (3) a national security organization receives the information, and 
(4) the intelligence questions are asked directly of a group of potential sources.105  
F. CROWDSOURCING AND FORECAST ACCURACY  
The literature suggests that crowdsourcing of intelligence may lead to 
improvements in forecast accuracy. Indeed, in the past five years, the Intelligence 
Community has started to explore the potential of crowd-based techniques to improve its 
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intelligence analysis efforts. Both of these facts are the basis for the argument in this 
thesis that crowdsourcing intelligence be included as one of the techniques for improving 
intelligence analysis.  
The literature makes a strong case that the crowds are indeed accurate, or “wise,” 
based on the relative accuracy of crowd-based prediction models. According to 
Bagherpour, “the U.S. Intelligence Community has created more than a half-dozen 
forecasting programs over the last few years through its research unit, the Intelligence 
Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA).”106 For example, one forecasting 
program run by IARPA features a tournament between hybrid teams made up of both 
humans and machines. It is designed to exploit evidence that the best forecasting results 
when predictions are generated by computer algorithms augmented with human 
guidance. This program is a follow on to an early attempt at crowdsourcing intelligence 
that was shut down in 2013, namely a program called FutureMap, which used a terrorism 
futures market in which participants placed bets on aspects of future terrorist acts. These 
were then aggregated to generate probability estimates for such acts. In part, this thesis is 
an attempt to examine whether and how intelligence can be crowdsourced, and if doing 
so may lead to improved forecasting by the Intelligence Community. 
In his seminal 2004 book, The Wisdom of Crowds, Surowiecki states four 
conditions are a prerequisite for crowds to be wise: (1) opinion and backgrounds in the 
crowd must be diverse, (2) members of the crowd are independent in terms of how they 
arrive at their judgments, (3) the crowd is decentralized (people are able to specialize and 
draw on local knowledge), and (4) a mechanism aggregates crowd judgment.107 Since 
Surowiecki published his book, a large amount of research has been conducted on why 
crowds are wise and on how to extract and apply the wisdom of crowds via 
crowdsourcing.  
The literature contains several examples of crowdsourcing efforts aimed at 
solving intelligence community analytic problems to include the Good Judgment Project, 
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efforts to crowdsource in real-time analysis of the identities and motivations of the 
Boston bombers, and the work the Arms Control Wonk does in Syria and Iraq. A 
description and analysis of each of these efforts is provided in the following sections. 
1. The Good Judgment Project 
The most salient example of crowdsourcing intelligence is the Good Judgment 
Project, which is sponsored by the IARPA.108 The project tests the ability of graduate 
students, faculty, and practitioners from the political science realm to forecast global 
geopolitical events.109 Moreover, the project works by: 
Recruit[ing] over 2,000 forecasters ranging from graduate students to 
forecasting and political science faculty and practitioners. Each forecaster 
was randomly assigned to one of the three trainings (none, probability, or 
scenario training) and to one of the four different modes of information 
sharing (individual predictions in isolation, individual predictions seeing 
what others predict, a prediction market, or team predictions). Predictions 
were evaluated using the Brier scores…Brier scores for each problem on 
each day were averaged over all of the days the problem was open, and 
then the scores for all the problems were averaged. Individuals or, in the 
team setting, teams were encouraged to minimize their Brier score. No 
financial reward was given, but there was a “Leader Board” making public 
the most successful people... [The study] compared a variety of 
aggregation methods, looking at combinations of different: 
• weightings of forecasters based on their personality and expertise 
attributes, averaged either using a weighted mean or a weighted median 
• down-weightings of older forecasts using exponential decay 
• transformations of the aggregated forecasts to push them away from 0.5 
and towards more extreme values110 
Refer to Ungar et al.’s The Good Judgment Project: A Large Scale Test of 
Different Methods of Combining Expert Predictions that found that the most successful 
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forecasters generally are characterized by significant levels of political knowledge and 
general intelligence, and they did not need access to classified material or more than 
modest training in probability and statistics to exceed the success rate of career 
intelligence analysts in predicting geopolitical events by over 30 percent.111 This 
improved accuracy did not result from systemic failure on the part of the career 
intelligence analysts or from extraordinary abilities on the part of the citizen participants. 
Rather, it was the result of the impact of probability and statistics in action. The more 
forecasts are used to make a given prediction, the more likely that the mean of those 
forecasts will reflect reality better than individual forecasts or even small groups of 
forecasts. As Spiegel explains on a 2014 NPR segment: 
In other words, there are errors on every side of the mark, but there is a 
truth at the center that people are responding to, and if you average a large 
number of predictions together, the errors will end up canceling each other 
out, and you are left with a more accurate guess.112 
Examining the results of the Good Judgment Project further, Mellars et al. found 
that the best forecasters benefitted from formal training in probability and statistics, 
worked in environments characterized by teamwork, and took their predictions seriously 
in that they spent significant amounts of time developing and updating their forecasts.113 
Commenting on the work of Ungar et al., Bisogno describes: 
Working in groups greatly improves prediction accuracy. The question of 
how to utilize the wisdom of the crowds…is more difficult to answer than 
whether or not that wisdom is valuable: “Although the ‘wisdom of the 
crowds’ and the power of predictive markets are widely recognized, it is 
less clear how to best make use of that wisdom.”114  
An important dynamic the study observes is the risk of group-think when 
experts are able to discuss their predictions. While the study acknowledges 
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the inverse is also possible—that better arguments can be formed this 
way—this thesis theorizes there may be a risk of groupthink in homeland 
security and government enterprises unless outside perspectives are 
considered due to cultural biases and organizational tendencies.115 
2. The Boston Bombing-Crowdsourcing Gone Awry 
The Boston Marathon bombing in 2013 provides an example of crowdsourcing 
that went awry, in part. According to Bisogno:  
[A] student was wrongly suspected as one of the bombers and became the 
victim of a “digital witch hunt.” Before authorities had officially identified 
a suspect, independent websites posted the student’s photo online, and he 
was subsequently followed by private citizens (not investigators).116  
The news media unquestioningly reported the false identification without verifying the 
truthfulness of information coming from the independent parties online.117 Subsequently, 
the media disseminated the identification to the nation in a way that suggested that the 
information was both validated and certain. Effectively, individuals online, bystanders, 
and the media performed a criminal investigation without the training to do so.118 
Moreover, they also effectively ignored legal considerations and legal constraints, as well 
as the rights of the accused and critical contextual information.119 Tapia, LaLone, and 
Kim describe what the actions some mainstream online groups took, and they 
characterize the results of these actions as “dangerous and perhaps criminal.”120 As 
events unfolded, several other innocent individuals were characterized as suspects by 
these groups based on unvetted and unvalidated information.  
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Yet, this crowdsourced effort was somewhat successful. The information 
gathering effort, whereby the crowd’s pictures and videos of the event provided to the 
authorities, was a resounding success, while the attempt to crowdsource the criminal 
investigation proved a dismal failure. Individuals are a good crowdsourcing resource in 
terms of both providing information and reporting events. However, crowds fail when it 
comes to crowdsourcing taking action. When only providing information to the 
authorities, individuals are effective at augmenting the resources of the authorities. 
According to Tapia LaLone, and Kim:  
Seattle’s Police Department runs a program where citizens can receive 
tweets about and report when they spot stolen cars. German police have 
experimented with posting sketches of wanted criminals on Facebook FB 
+1.51%, where citizen’s identifications have already led to several arrests. 
In another example, a Broward County Sheriff has leveraged his 10,000 
Facebook friends to successfully track down stolen goods.121 
3. Arms Control Wonk 
Refer to Lewis’ blog, which provides two additional examples of crowdsourcing 
in an intelligence context.122 In 2011, Arms Control Wonk, a blogging community, 
analyzed imagery of what was purported to be a textile factory near the Syrian town of Al 
Hasaka. This alleged factory had attracted the attention of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) as a potential nuclear site. The bloggers evaluated open-source 
imagery (photos, video, and satellite images) of the area and also interpreted Arab-
language media reports describing the facility. Based on this analytic work, Arms Control 
Wonk successfully determined that the facility was as a textile mill built with East 
German assistance decades earlier.123  
Arms Control Wonk also used crowdsourcing to analyze four videos of the 
remains of a probable nuclear reactor undeclared to the IAEA at Al Kibar, also in Syria. 
The Syrian Opposition obtained these videos and posted them to YouTube. The reactor 
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site had been bombed by the Israeli Air Force. The videos showed details of the site that 
seemed to indicate the site’s capture by the opposition. Participants in the crowdsourcing 
effort (including former IAEA official Olli Heinonen) confirmed that the videos, which 
were taken with mobile phones, were authentic and that the videos were consistent with 
what was known at the time about the general details of the site. On further examination, 
the videos allowed Arms Control Wonk to determine that a building on the site contained 
at least five stationary Scud-type missile launchers, which were designed to be fired 
through openings in the roof. In addition, Arms Control Wonk successfully confirmed the 
firing Scud-type rockets on cities in the northern parts of the country.124  
A review of the literature provides the basis for a solid understanding of 
crowdsourcing. Indeed, multiple sources suggest alternative taxonomies of 
crowdsourcing types and examples of rules for effective crowdsourcing. The literature 
includes multiple avenues for further inquiry, as well as multiple case studies of 
crowdsourced solutions to real-world problems in business, the sciences, marketing, 
funding, and studies examining the effectiveness of crowdsourcing in solving intelligence 
problems. However, the literature includes few studies of the effectiveness of 
crowdsourcing for making predictions in an intelligence context as compared to 
alternative techniques. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The literature review suggests that the creation of a combined methodology based 
on prediction markets and crowdsourcing of analytic inputs that improves the accuracy of 
intelligence analysis and forecasting is possible. Furthermore, the literature review has 
identified characteristics of intelligence culture that negatively affect the accuracy of 
intelligence analysis and forecasts. The review suggests that a crowd and prediction 
markets-based methodology can address these sources of forecast inaccuracy.  
Generally speaking, the literature review resulted in few surprises. However, three 
issues are of concern: 
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• Comparative dearth of recent scholarly analysis of Intelligence 
Community culture is a concern in that much of the review of Intelligence 
Community culture in this thesis dates to the first half of the 2000s and 
may be out of date as circumstances may have changed.  
• Literature search did not identify scholarly analyses of past applications of 
crowd- and prediction markets-based techniques by the Intelligence 
Community beyond a few instances, despite multiple expressions of 
general interest by the Intelligence Community, funding by the IARPA of 
the ACE program, and the existence of the Good Judgment Project as a 
pilot. 
• Activity on scholarly work on prediction markets slowed significantly 
starting in 2013. 
Each of these issues cited previously has implications for the thesis. In the case of 
the lack of recent scholarly research on Intelligence Community culture, the thesis 
proceeds from the assertions that: (1) Intelligence Community culture takes a very long 
time to change, and so although dated, the available scholarly research is relevant, and (2) 
the few examples of recent work in this area do not suggest significant changes in 
Intelligence Community culture that may falsify previous work in the field. As for the 
lack of past applications of prediction markets-based techniques by the Intelligence 
Community, given that the literature on the use of these techniques in other contexts is so 
rich, moving the thesis forward by reasoning by analogy is quite possible and indeed 
justified. As for activity on scholarly works on prediction markets slowing significantly 
since 2013, the key thing to consider is that the literature search unearthed comparatively 
little recent research falsifying the claims of increased forecast accuracy using the 
technique. 
Based on the results of the Good Judgment Project, and on the results of 
applications of similar methodologies in other non-intelligence contexts, it is likely that 
intelligence assessments may be improved through the adroit application of 
crowdsourcing and prediction markets-based techniques to the problem of intelligence 
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forecasting. Toward this end, the thesis analyzes practices in the application of crowd and 
prediction markets-based techniques to forecasting in other, non-intelligence contexts and 
uses that analysis as the basis for developing a crowd and prediction markets-based 
forecasting methodology for use by the Intelligence Community.  
The next chapter discusses relevant practices in crowdsourcing drawn from 
multiple disciplines. These practices serve as a foundation for subsequent work on 
prediction markets and for the development of the intelligence analytic and forecast 
methodology that is the central aim of this thesis.  
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III. CROWDSOURCING PRACTICES  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter II introduced prediction markets and crowd-based techniques for 
performing analysis and making forecasts, and it discussed these techniques in the 
context of intelligence analysis and forecasting. Chapter II also introduced intelligence 
culture and examined the implications of intelligence culture for analytic and forecast 
accuracy. This chapter is a more detailed discussion of relevant practices in crowd-based 
problem solving, including the solution of analytic and forecasting-based problems, and it 
covers practices used in the design of crowd sourced problem solving efforts drawn from 
multiple disciplinary contexts. Given the primary goal of the thesis to develop an 
effective crowd-based forecasting and analytic methodology, it is necessarily to select 
and apply known practices in the design of crowdsourcing efforts as a precursor. Areas of 
interest are those practices central to the effectiveness of the crowdsourcing effort and 
include: 
• practices in making the decision to crowdsource 
• practices in crowdsourced task design 
• practices in finding the right crowd 
• practices in managing the crowdsourcing process 
• practices in screening and aggregating the results of the crowds’ work  
B. WHEN SHOULD A TASK BE CROWDSOURCED 
Crowdsourcing is useful under certain circumstances according to Chiu, Liang, 
and Turban:  
Organizations deploy crowdsourcing when they have a problem they need 
to solve, when they want to exploit opportunities, or when they need a 
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large amount of inexpensive labor to perform small tasks (microtasks) that 
they cannot or do not want to do in-house.125  
Schenk and Guittard provide a taxonomy of tasks suitable for crowdsourcing, 
including: (1) simple (routine) tasks with low costs per task and large economies of scale, 
(2) complex tasks for which the crowdsourcer either lacks the requisite skills or lacks 
satisfactory in-house solutions, and (3) creative tasks where creativity and uniqueness 
have value.126 Crowdsourcers are further characterized by Hossaini et al. (summarized in 
Table 1) by the terms of the incentive mechanism they adopt, how they recruit, and how 
they incentivize the crowd, as well as crowdsourcers’ ethicality and the level of privacy 
they provide to crowdsourcees.127 
Table 1. Features of Crowdsourced Efforts128 
The Crowdsourcer Features Short Descriptions 
1. Incentives Provision Providing stimulation for the participants 
1.1. Financial incentives Providing monetary incentives 
1.2. Social incentives Providing community recognition 
1.3. Entertainment incentives Providing gamified and enjoyable experience 
2. Open Call Providing an open audition for participation 
3. Ethicality Provision Providing and following ethical practices 
3.1. Opt-out procedure Providing a method for participants to opt out 
3.2. Feedback to crowd Providing feedback about participants’ performance 
and results 
3.3. No harm to crowd Providing a physically and mentally safe environment 
4. Privacy Provision Providing privacy options for participants 
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Of these crowdsourcer characteristics, the incentives provision characteristic is 
the most critical to the crowdsourcing effort, as discussed in detail in the next section. 
Ethicality and privacy characteristics are self-explanatory with one exception, the need to 
provide feedback to the crowd. The literature provides a few instances of the impact of 
feedback mechanisms. Generally, providing feedback can be both an incentive for 
crowdsources and a way for improving the effectiveness of the crowdsourcing effort.  
C. CROWDSOURCED TASK DESIGN PRACTICES 
A critical part of any crowdsourcing effort is the design of the crowdsourced 
tasks. The requesters (people requesting the crowdsourced effort) first need to estimate 
the workforce required, and second, they have to break the task down into subtasks so 
that the individual subtasks and the overarching task are tractable. The requesters must 
ensure that the execution of each subtask does not affect the performance of any other 
subtask. Hossaini et al. provide typical crowdsourced task characteristics as listed in 
Table 2.129 Crowdsourced tasks that have some to many of the characteristics listed in 
Table 2 are suitable for analysis or execution using crowd-based techniques. 
Table 2. Crowdsources Task Characteristics130 
The Crowdsourced Task Short Descriptions 
1. Traditional operation How the crowdsourcing task is conventionally 
performed 
1.1. In-house Task performed by employees 
1.2. Outsourced Task performed by outside organizations 
2. Outsourcing Task The true nature of a crowdsourced task is that it can be 
outsourced 
3. Modularity How task can be broken up into smaller tasks 
3.1. Atomic tasks Task is indivisible 
3.2. Divisible to micro tasks Task can be divided into micro tasks 
4. Complexity The complexity measurements of the task 
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The Crowdsourced Task Short Descriptions 
4.1. Simple tasks Task is simple and straightforward 
4.2. Complex tasks Task is difficult and not straightforward 
5. Solvability How task is solved 
5.1. Simple for humans Task is simple enough to be solved by individuals 
5.2. Complex for computers Task is too complicated to be solved by computers 
6. Automation Characteristics How task can be automated 
6.1. Difficult to automate Task is difficult (if not impossible) to automate 
6.2. Expensive to automate Task is expensive to automate 
7. User-driven The individuals’ perception of the task 
7.1. Problem solving Task is a problem to be solved 
7.2. Innovation Task needs individual’s innovation 
7.3. Co-creation Task needs individuals collaboration in production 
8. Contribution Type How task can be performed 
8.1. Individual contribution Individuals perform on their own to reach a solution 
8.2. Collaborative contribution Individuals need to collaborate to reach a solution 
 
Crowdsourced tasks can be implemented sequentially, in parallel, or by divide 
and conquer implementation. According to Chitilapilly et al. in sequential 
implementation, the tasks are divided by the crowdsourcer into “small subtasks” and are 
“executed in sequence,” by taking the output of a given task as “input to the next 
task.”131 In parallel implementations, tasks are divided into independent subtasks, run 
together in parallel, and later, the crowdsourcer merges them together to “form the final 
output.”132 In divide and conquer implementations, the overarching problem is 
“recursively split into smaller, far easier problems.”133 Once the crowd solves them, the 
crowdsourcer merges the solutions back to “generate the final problem solutions.”134 The 
incentive structure used to reward participation and accuracy in tasks or subtasks must 
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also be addressed as part of the design. Details on incentive structure and its implications 
are in Section B.  
D. PRACTICES IN FINDING THE CROWD 
Refer to Geiger et al. who considered two mechanisms for selecting a proper 
crowd, namely qualification-based mechanisms and context-specific mechanisms.135 
Under a qualification-based participant selection system, potential crowdsources have to 
demonstrate certain knowledge or skills before they are allowed to contribute. In a 
context-specific election mechanism, the crowd is selected by the crowdsourcer based on 
the decision context. For example, the crowd could consist of individuals who bought a 
washing machine in the last year if a company was deciding on the attributes of the next 
year’s model. 
Finding the right crowd is critical to the success of any crowdsourced effort. The 
crowd must be diverse, comparatively large, and well-motivated. The crowd for a given 
task “may include different populations (non-experts, experts, informal members, 
customers, business partners, etc.)” and may vary in “size, composition, uniformity, and 
level of expertise.”136 As listed in Table 3, Hossaini et al. provide some key features of 
effective crowds.137 Of these characteristics, the diversity and suitability characteristics 
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Table 3. Features of the Crowd138 
The Crowd Features Short Descriptions 
1. Diversity The state or quality of being different or varied 
1.1. Spatial diversity Diversity in location (geographical, department, etc.) 
1.2. Gender diversity Diversity in gender (male or female) 
1.3. Age diversity Diversity in age 
1.4. Expertise diversity Diversity in skills, knowledge, or proficiency 
2. Unknown-ness The condition or fact of being anonymous 
2.1. Not known to crowdsourcer Being anonymous to the crowdsourcer 
2.2. Not known to each other Being anonymous to other individuals in the crowd 
3. Largeness Consisting of big numbers 
3.1. Number fulfils the task Enough individuals to solve the problem 
3.2. Number not abundant Enough individuals to avoid confusion or management 
issues 
4. Undefined-ness Not being determined, random 
5. Suitability Suiting a given purpose, occasion, or condition 
5.1. Competence Ability and expertise in performing a task 
5.2. Collaboration Working together with other individuals 
5.3. Volunteering Offering capabilities to perform a task 
5.4. Motivation The inspiration to perform a task 
5.4.1. Mental satisfaction Joy of performing a task 
5.4.2. Self-esteem Feeling proud and confident 
5.4.3. Personal skill development Developing individual’s abilities 
5.4.4. Knowledge sharing Distributing the personal information 
5.4.5. Love of community Caring about one’s community 
 
Crowdsourcing platforms like Amazon Mechanical Turk or CrowdFlower may be 
a good starting point for building the crowd necessary for the crowdsourced task(s). 
Other options include inviting the participation of members of a given community, say 
political science graduate students, or from communities that have a stake in the outcome 
of the task.  
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E. PRACTICES IN STRUCTURING INCENTIVES FOR 
CROWDSOURCEES 
It is a crowdsourcing axiom (supported by research) that an active, diverse, and 
comparatively large crowd of participants is central to successful crowdsourcing efforts. 
Thus, the motivation of crowdsourcees is crucial. Upon review of the literature, 
Morschheuser et al. found a plethora of studies on what motivates crowdsources, and 
they list a wide variety of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations for participation.139 Intrinsic 
motivators ranged from indulging participants’ creativity, to allowing participants to 
enjoy autonomy, to helping participants develop their own skills and feel competent, to 
enabling participants to enjoy a pastime, or to achieve social recognition. Extrinsic 
motivators included financial payoffs or external social reasons.140 According to Liu, 
“Evidence shows that prizes and rewards can increase participation rates, but 
opportunities for learning and skill building are essential for enhancing the quality of 
participants’ contributions.”141 
Gamification is another way of increasing the likelihood that the crowd will 
indeed participate in the crowdsourcing effort by making the crowdsourced work take on 
the characteristics a game, which thus provides an incentive to participate other than that 
of monetary compensation. The purpose of gamification is to change crowdsourcees’ 
motivations from those of an extrinsic gain-seeker individual to those of an intrinsically 
self-motivated individual. Hamri, Koivisto, and Sarsa, as well as Seaborn and Fels, 
reviewed research on gamification and found that gamification was likely to lead to 
increases in crowd participation.142  
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Gamified experience designs often include combining points with leaderboards to 
create competition between crowdsourcees. Points can also be combined with other 
elements, such as time limits, the level of crowdsourcees participation, rewards for 
cooperation, badges, and missions visualizing specific goals. Crowdsourcees’ behavioral 
outcomes as engendered by gamification often revolve around the participation level of 
crowdsourcees in the gamified effort. Several studies report increases in (long-term) 
participation, increases in the quality of output, as well as reductions in cheating 
behaviors. However, financial incentives have the greatest impact. Simple gamification 
using points and leaderboard replace financial incentives when it comes to incentivizing 
crowdprocessing. Indeed, for such tasks, a review of the literature by Chittilappilly, 
Chen, and Amer-Yahia finds “Monetary incentives are the best and easiest way to 
motivate.”143 
F. PRACTICES IN MANAGING THE CROWDSOURCING PROCESS 
Issues related to the crowdsourcing process include process governance, process 
design, legal issues, and the characteristics of the crowdsourcing platform. Process 
designs for crowdsourcing systems center around the type of problem to be addressed. 
Common critical configuration items for crowdsourcing efforts focus on complex tasks or 
sentiment elicitation, as determined by a survey of experts conducted by Hossaini et al., 
which include choices regarding diversity and financial or other incentives to spur 
motivation, the crowdsourcing platform’s ease of use, presence or absence of feedback, 
and types of feedback mechanisms, largeness, and competence of participants.144 The 
design of each task and subtask involves choices (as discussed previously), the 
sequencing of tasks, and the parameters of the task itself. Simple estimation tasks are 
designed differently from conditional estimation tasks, which are yet again different from 
tasks requiring the application of expert judgment. According to Luz, Silva, and Novais, 
crowdsourcing workflows consist of (1) selecting workers and distributing the task(s), (2) 
assigning tasks to workers, (3) task performance (4) assessment of task results; (5) 
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aggregation of task results, and (6) giving workers rewards consistent with worker 
incentives.145 These workflows are best managed using dedicated Web 2.0 platforms as 
described in the next section.  
Chiu, Liang, and Turban speak to the importance of the choice of a 
crowdsourcing platform when they posit, “Proper matching between platform functions 
and task types can enhance the performance of crowdsourcing.”146 Hossaini et al. 
provide an overview of key crowdsourcing platform characteristics, saying, “A 
crowdsourcing platform would typically need to offer four main facilities; facilities that 
deal with the crowd, facilities that deal with the crowdsourcer, facilities that deal with the 
crowdsourced task, and facilities that are related to the platform itself.”147 The details of 
each key crowdsourcing platform characteristic Hosaini et al. determined are given in 
Table 4.  
Table 4. Crowdsourcing Platform Characteristics148 
The Crowdsourcing Platform 
Facilities 
Short Descriptions 
1. Crowd-related Interactions Facilities in the platform that relate to the crowd 
1.1. Provide enrolment Means to enroll the individuals 
1.2. Provide authentication Means to authenticate the individuals 
1.3. Provide skill declaration Means to help the individuals declare their skills 
1.4. Provide task assignment Means to assign tasks to the right individuals 
1.5. Provide assistance Means to help the individuals during the performing of 
the task 
1.6. Provide result submission Means to help the individuals to send their results 
1.7. Coordinate crowd Means to coordinate performers in a certain task 
1.8. Supervise crowd Means to supervise individuals during their 
performance 
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The Crowdsourcing Platform 
Facilities 
Short Descriptions 
1.9. Provide feedback loops Means to give feedback to individuals about their 
performance and about the results 
2. Crowdsourcer-related 
Interactions 
Facilities in the platform that relate to the crowdsourcer 
2.1. Provide enrolment Means to enroll the crowdsourcers 
2.2. Provide authentication Means to authenticate the crowdsourcers 
2.3. Provide task broadcast Means to broadcast the task to the right individuals 
2.4. Provide assistance Means to help the crowdsourcers for announcing the 
task 
2.5. Provide time negotiation Means to help crowdsourcers negotiate time 
requirements with the individuals 
2.6. Provide price negotiation Meanstohelpcrowdsourcersnegotiateperformanceprices
withtheindividuals 
2.7. Provide result verification Means to verify whether submitted results meet the 
needs of crowdsourcers 
2.8. Provide feedback loops Means to give feedback to crowdsourcers about 
individuals’ performances 
3. Task-related Facilities Facilities in the platform that relate to the task 
3.1. Aggregate results Means to collect and unify submitted results 
3.2. Hide results from others Means to hide individuals’ results from each other for 
privacy reasons 
3.3. Store history of completed tasks Means to keep a history of the completed tasks and 
related information (such as who completed them, the 
spent time, etc.) 
3.4. Provide quality threshold Means to guarantee the required quality of results 
3.5. Provide quantity threshold Means to guarantee the required number of responses 
4. Platform-related Facilities Facilities in the platform that relate to the platform 
itself 
4.1. Online environment Means to keep the platform online and accessible to 
individuals 
4.2. Manage platform misuse Means to report if there are instances of platform 
misuse 
4.3. Provide ease of use Means to keep the platform simple to use 
4.4. Provide attraction Means to keep the platform attractive to use 
4.5. Provide interaction Means to keep the platform interactive 
4.6. Provide payment mechanism Means to enable crowdsourcers to pay individuals in 
their preferred way 
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G. PRACTICES IN SCREENING AND AGGREGATING THE CROWD’S 
RESULTS 
Once the crowdsourcees have performed their work or are in the process of 
performing their work, genuine answers must then be separated from those of cheaters 
using different quality control methods (the work must actually be done in a credible 
way), and then the workers’ results need to be aggregated to create the final 
crowdsourced answer. In other words, the alternative solutions, or other output from the 
crowd, have to be evaluated. Often, the output of individuals in the crowd is aggregated 
when doing so and the quality of work judged in the light of the task’s stated goals.  
H. RELEVANT PRACTICES IN THE DESIGN OF THIS 
CROWDSOURCING EFFORT 
The relevance of a given crowdsourcing practice to the thesis must be determined 
based on the overall vision for the analytic and forecasting methodology proposed in this 
thesis. As discussed in Chapter I, the proposed methodology combines prediction markets 
techniques with crowd-based techniques. It can be argued that a prediction market is a 
specific implementation of a crowdsourced problem solving methodology.  
The relevant crowd-based practices discussed in this chapter are both an adjunct 
to and compatible with the relevant prediction markets practices discussed in Chapter IV. 
In this context, the broad design features of the crowdsourced task (the prediction market) 
are discussed in the following sections. Note that the thesis only proposes a design for the 
crowdsourced prediction markets-based analytic and forecast methodology; 
implementation and testing of the design is left to others.  
Key features of the crowdsourced task proposed in this thesis parallel those the 
tables in this chapter depict. First, choices made from the incentive related options in 
Table 1 include (1) the use of incentives for participation in the task centered on social 
and entertainment based incentives, (2) the provision of feedback, and (3) the 
maintenance of privacy. Social and entertainment-based incentives are appropriate for 
this effort given the issues surrounding the use of financial incentives (discussed in detail 
in Chapter IV). Second, social imperatives, such as peer recognition and the spirit of 
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competition, also will incentivize participants. Third, the crowdsourced tasks are also 
gamified, discussed as follows, which drives the entertainment value of participation. 
Fourth, feedback is provided in an effort to maintain engagement in the task by playing to 
the desire of most individuals to do well, as measured against their peers by learning from 
feedback, and by providing tools that can enable greater participant performance self-
improvement, to which most individuals aspire. Fifth, participant privacy is maintained to 
ensure that participants can freely share their opinions without negative consequences 
and so that poor performance on the task does not serve as a disincentive for 
participation, as may be the case if the identity of the poor performer is publicly known. 
Sixth, open call is not used to allow the sponsor of the crowdsourced effort to control the 
composition of the community attempting the crowdsourced task. This control is essential 
to achieve the appropriate levels of diversity of opinion and the right mix between 
insiders and outsiders in terms of access to information not available to the public. 
Choices made from the task related design options in Table 2 include task designs 
that are (1) modular and atomic, (2) complex, (3) solvable, (4) difficult to automate, (5) 
based on user driven problem solving and innovation, and (6) for some tasks, co-creation 
(team built). The need for task modularity and atomicity is driven by the notion that the 
intelligence problems the crowd will be asked to address have definable, measureable, 
and clear outcomes, and thus, avoid the need for a hierarchy of subtasks with ambiguous 
outcomes that crowd members must complete first. By definition, the tasks the crowd 
will solve are complex and difficult to automate; otherwise, the need for the effort will be 
negated. Tasks will also be designed to be solvable, in that participants will be able to 
come up with an answer to the question being posed, but the accuracy of that answer will 
depend of the participant’s forecasting ability. Furthermore, it goes without saying that 
the whole purpose of the crowdsourced effort is to bring problem solving skills and 
innovation to the task of intelligence analysis and that the effort will allow teamwork, 
that is co-creation, for some tasks as a way of testing the effectiveness of teams in 
performing intelligence analysis tasks.  
The choice of crowd is based on a consideration of the options in Table 3 and 
determined by the sponsor. Based on the need for predictive accuracy, the crowd is to be 
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diverse, as assessed by gender, background, age, expertise, and also suitable, as defined 
by background, competence, and skill. The crowdsponsor is periodically reassessed to 
determine participant suitability based on a predictive track record, as well as ongoing 
levels of participation. The crowd is to be known to the crowdsponsor but not to each 
other to ensure adequate diversity in the case of the former and independence of opinion 
in the case of the latter. 
In terms of platform design, commercially available platforms for crowdsourcing 
efforts (in general) and prediction markets (in particular) address the entire range of 
crowdsourcing platform requirements listed in Table 4. Finally, the prediction markets 
that make up the methodology proposed in this thesis are a special case of crowdsourcing 
problem solving that by their nature aggregate and screen results. As a result, particular 
attention does not have to be paid to aggregating and screening results in this context.  
I. CONCLUSION 
Design characteristics central to the effectiveness of the crowdsourcing effort 
include:  
• practices in making the decision to crowdsource 
• practices in crowdsourced task design 
• practices in finding the right crow 
• practices in managing the crowdsourcing process 
• practices in screening and aggregating the results of the crowds’ work  
Although many possible variations of crowdsourcing effort design are possible, 
this chapter reviewed some of the most salient characteristics of crowdsourced efforts and 
selected several design parameters for inclusion in crowdsources design methodology 
that this thesis develops. The researcher selected these parameters based on their likely 
impact on the performance of the crowdsourced effort and their impact on participant 
involvement and diversity (an indirect driver of crowdsourcing effectiveness). This 
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design effort is crucial to both the design of the prediction market developed in Chapter 
IV and to the overall success of the analytic and forecasting methodology proposed in 
subsequent chapters. The next chapter builds on this chapter by considering and choosing 
prediction markets design options consistent with the crowd sourcing practices previously 
discussed and that reflect the design requirements of this thesis’ methodology.  
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IV. PREDICTION MARKETS PRACTICES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter II introduced prediction markets and crowd-based techniques for 
performing analysis and making forecasts, and it discussed these techniques in the 
context of intelligence analysis and forecasting. Chapter II also introduced intelligence 
culture and examined the implications of intelligence culture for analytic and forecast 
accuracy. This chapter has a detailed discussion of relevant practices in designing 
prediction markets for forecasting that covers design practices drawn from multiple 
disciplinary contexts. Given the primary goal of this thesis discussed in Chapter I, the 
selection and application of known practices in prediction markets design is required as a 
precursor to the development and presentation of the thesis’ intelligence analytic 
methodology in subsequent chapters. Areas of interest this chapter covers are those 
central to the accuracy of prediction markets and include incentive mechanisms, trading 
processes, clearing house design, and investor (participant) management processes. 
Additionally, this chapter reviews existing practices in each of the aforementioned areas 
of prediction markets design and identifies relevant practices for implementation in the 
analytic methodology developed in this thesis. 
B. PREDICTION MARKET DESIGN 
Prediction market design in large part determines how accurate the prediction 
market is in forecasting future events. This section introduces and discusses the key 
prediction market design parameter choices that must be considered and selected for the 
greatest forecast accuracy.  
1. Design of Prediction Markets Incentive Mechanisms 
Properly designed incentive mechanisms ensure both that participants in a given 
prediction market are invested in giving their best analytic efforts as they make their 
predictions and that participants engage in the market at a sufficient level so that the 
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market is updated as new information becomes available.149 Table 5 contains factors 
related to prediction market incentive structures.150 
Table 5. Prediction Market Incentive Mechanisms 
Prediction Markets Design Factors: Incentive Mechanisms 
Performance Performance evaluation 
Wealth: portfolio value based 
Accuracy: best predictors 
Effort: trading behaviors minimum 







Tournament: performance based 
Lottery: luck based 
Involvement 
  Trading sessions 
  Workshops 
  Training 
  Other 
 
The incentive structure embodied within successful prediction markets revolves 
around motivating serious participant engagement as exemplified by the frequency and 
quality of participants’ trades. Ideally, participants in the prediction market should find 
the participation incentive sufficient to motivate engagement, the level of work required 
for participation manageable, and adequate reciprocity occurs between market sponsors 
                                                 
149 Justin Wolfers and Eric Zitzewitz, “Prediction Markets,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, 
no. 2 (2004): 107–126.  
150 Gaspoz, Prediction Markets Supporting Technology, 82–83.  
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and participants. Active, public commitment by participants’ management (in the case of 
private prediction markets) to the prediction market effort also helps.151 
Three design factors in Table 5 deserve further discussion. First, no proof exists 
that using real money as a reward leads to superior accuracy in making predictions.152 
Second, in terms of the reward base, the rank order tournament or fixed payouts for 
accuracy seem superior to other pay for performance schemes in serving as incentive 
mechanisms.153 Finally, it is possible to use various different schemes to initiate and 
maintain involvement in public and private prediction markets. No one or group of 
involvement mechanisms is clearly superior.154  
2. Design of Prediction Markets Trading Process 
Table 6 presents the design factors related to prediction market trading 
processes.155  
  
                                                 
151 Carolin Decker, Isabelle M. Welpe, and Bernd H. Ankenbrand, “How to Motivate People to Put 
Their Money Where Their Mouth Is: What Makes Employees Participate in Electronic Prediction 
Markets,” Technological Forecasting and Social 78, no. 6 (2011): 1002–1015; Tung H. Ho and Kay Y. 
Chen, “New Product Blockbusters: The Magic and Science of Prediction Markets,” California 
Management Review 50, no. 1 (2007): 144–158.  
152 Tom W. Bell, “Private Prediction Markets and the Law,” Journal of Prediction Markets 3, no. 1 
(2009): 89–110; Emile Servan-Schreiber et al., “Prediction Markets: Does Money Matter?,” Electronic 
Markets 14, no. 3 (2004): 243–251, doi: 10.1080/1019678042000245254.  
153 Stefan Luckner, “How to Pay Traders in Information Markets: Results from a Field Experiment,” 
Journal of Prediction Markets 1, no. 2 (2007): 147–156.  
154 Luckner, 147–156.  
155 Gaspoz, Prediction Markets Supporting Technology, 1.  
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Table 6. Prediction Market Trading Process Characteristics 








Open order book 
Closed order book 
Market maker 
Market scoring rules 
Dynamic pari-mutuel 




Selected opening hours 
 
The effect of trading fees on prediction markets does not seem to have been 
studied in detail in the literature. Most extant prediction markets do not charge any of the 
types of fees Table 6 lists.156 In terms of prediction market trading mechanisms, the 
double auction, or its close cousin, the continuous double auction (CDA), are both 
analogous to the mechanisms used in financial markets and are also the most commonly 
used prediction market trading mechanism.  
A double auction occurs when traders submit buy or sell orders directly executed 
against opposite orders (each buy order at a given price is matched to another trader’s sell 
order at that price or is stored in an order book and then processed iteratively as 
countervailing sell orders come in). Unexecuted orders expire after a given period of 
time. This approach is advantageous because new information is incorporated into the 
market continuously as the prices at which participants place buy and sell orders change 
as the new information is digested by market participants. Market liquidity (the ability to 
find counterparties to a given trade) can be an issue. However, this issue can be addressed 
                                                 
156 Gaspoz, 83.  
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by adding participants, known as market makers. The market makers charge a premium 
to buy and a discount to sell from their own inventory, called a bid-ask spread, and by 
adjusting the amount of the bid-ask spread, the market makers ensure that the market 
clears (trades take place).This process also allows trades to occur at different times (that 
is a CDA) with the market makers trading against their own inventory until a 
counterparty can be found or the bid-ask spread is adjusted to clear the market. Market 
liquidity is always an issue for the market makers. Hanson found that CDAs work only in 
“thick market” scenarios (with a lot of trades and traders relative to the number of 
contracts traded).157 This issue, discussed in the next section, can be addressed by using 
a market scoring rule to govern the actions of the market makers.  
A market scoring rule takes the CDA, as described above, and modifies the 
behavior of the market and the market maker in particular to address liquidity concerns. 
Using a logarithmic market scoring rule requires that we first agree that there only two 
outcomes are possible: (1) Traders can only buy or sell shares of (bet on or against), and 
(2) only one of the two outcomes is guaranteed to occur over the course of time. The 
market maker tallies the total number of shares have purchased at a given time for each 
outcome. The market maker also uses a cost function that records how much money 








C=cost per share 
b=market liquidity maintained by the market maker (number of shares) 
q1=quantity of shares of outcome 1 
q2=quantity of shares of outcome 2 
                                                 
157 Robin Hanson, “Combinatorial Information Market Design,” Information System Frontiers 5, no. 
1 (2003): 107–119.  
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Then, traders individually submit how many shares of each outcome they want to 
buy or sell. The market makers then use the cost function to price each outcome and 
come up with a cost of the trade.158 Dynamic pari-mutuel markets (DPMs) are an 
alternative market mechanism to market scoring rule-based market makers. In traditional 
pari-mutuel markets:  
The …pari-mutuel market… is operated in a manner where market traders 
purchase shares for a specific possible outcome. When the outcome is 
determined, the money collected is paid out to the winners in proportion to 
the number of winning shares that they hold. This technique protects 
market organizer from sustaining a loss under any circumstance.159  
To quote the seminal work on DPMs by Pennock: 
A DPM acts as hybrid between a pari-mutuel market and a continuous 
double auction (CDA), inheriting some of the advantages of both. Like a 
pari-mutuel market, a DPM offers infinite buy-in liquidity and zero risk 
for the market institution; like a CDA, a DPM can continuously react to 
new information, dynamically incorporate information into prices, and 
allow traders to lock in gains or limit losses by selling prior to event 
resolution. The trader interface can be designed to mimic the familiar 
double auction format with bid-ask queues, though with an addition 
variable called the payoff per share. The DPM price function can be 
viewed as an automated market maker always offering to sell at some 
price, and moving the price appropriately according to demand. Since the 
mechanism is pari-mutuel (i.e., redistributive), it is guaranteed to pay out 
exactly the amount of money taken in.160 
Thus, unlike CDAs with market scoring rules, market makers do not experience 
any risk under the DPM, as it maintains the liquidity of the market. Luckner highlights 
one shortcoming of prediction markets using a DPM market maker; that under DPM, no 
                                                 
158 Robin Hanson, “On Market Maker Functions,” Journal of Prediction Markets 1, no. 1 (2007): 3–
15.  
159 Mark Peters, Anthony Man-Cho, and Ye Yinyu, “Pari-Mutuel Markets: Mechanisms and 
Performance,” in WINE 2007: Internet and Network Economics, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 
Series, vol. 4858 (Heidelberg: Springer, 2007), 82–83.  
160 David M. Pennock, “A Dynamic Pari-mutuel Market for Hedging, Wagering, and Information 
Aggregation,” in Proceedings of the Fifth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC’04) (New York: 
ACM, 2004), 172. 
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incentive exists to buy early.161 The best strategy is to wait until the last moment to buy, 
which negates the continuous discovery of event probabilities at all points in time that is 
a hallmark of prediction markets using CDAs with market scoring rules.162 The utility of 
market makers using DPM-based market makers is supported by Slamka, Skiera, and 
Spann when they found:  
That logarithmic scoring rules and the dynamic pari-mutuel market attain 
the highest forecasting accuracy, good robustness against parameter 
misspecification, the ability to incorporate new information into prices, 
and the lowest losses for operators.163 
3. Design of Prediction Markets Clearing Houses  
Table 7 lists design factors related to prediction market trading processes.164 
Order matching can be based on price-submission (sort and match by price and then sort 
by time of submission and give priority to the oldest orders) or price quantity (sort and 
match by price and then sort by quantity and give priority to the smallest orders). In 
theory, spending caps may be required in play money markets to prevent participants 
form manipulating the market.165 However, most extant prediction markets do not 
enforce spending caps.  
Table 7. Clearing House Design 
Prediction Markets Design Factors: Clearing House 
Order 
Order matching rules 
Price and submission 
Price and quantity 
Order spending caps Enforced 
                                                 
161 Stefan Luckner, “Prediction Markets: Fundamentals, Key Design Elements and Applications,” in 
Proceedings on the 21st Bled Conference (Bled, Slovenia: Association for Information Systems, 2008), 
236–247. 
162 Luckner, 236–247.  
163 Slamka, Skiera, and Spann, “Prediction Market Performance,” 180–181. 
164 Gaspoz, Prediction Markets Supporting Technology, 170–171. 
165 Michael Abramowicz, “Deliberative Information Markets for Small Groups,” in Information 
Markets: A New Way of Making Decisions, ed. Robert Han and Paul Tetlock (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 
2006), 101–125.  
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Inflation Play money only 
Borrowing Margin purchases 
Endowment 
Initial endowment (money and/or contracts) 
Weekly endowment (money and/or contracts) 
Claim 
Claim IPO 
























Volume weighted average price 
Final market price 
 
CDA markets without market makers only use limit orders (buy or sell when the 
price reaches X; if X is not reached, the trade does not execute), whereas CDA markets 
with market makers can use market orders as well (execute the order at the present 
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market price). Many have argued that, in theory, constraints on short selling (selling 
shares one has borrowed from the market maker at a price set today in anticipation that 
the market price will drop) may lead to speculative bubbles in prediction markets; the 
degree to which short selling improves the quality of prediction market predictions is 
unknown.166 Similarly, the impact of margin (being able to borrow liquidity or other 
assets from the market maker) is unknown; however, in theory, this type of borrowing 
can result in poor predictors in play money markets “doubling down” by borrowing in 
support of poor predictions and thus exerting too much influence on the market.167 
Players can be given endowments of play money or stocks (predictions) to use in the 
market once during the start of the prediction market or on a weekly basis or some 
combination thereof. The literature does not adequately explore the impact of the timing, 
asset mix, and quantity of such endowments. 
The claim IPO process is the process by which new assets (predictions) are 
created. Traders and the market makers can initiate IPOs. Individuals can decide which 
predictions should have IPOs by including items of interest to the market makers. The 
predictions can be screened by experts appointed by the market makers or made by the 
market itself. In the latter case, once enough players have placed orders for the asset 
(prediction), the IPO takes place. IPO prices can be fixed by the market makers or 
discovered by auctioning the asset on the market. One thing is certain; all IPOs should 
have clear claims. Badly worded claims may be unresolvable (i.e., impossible to prove), 
and as such, it is essential that claims are clear and understood by all participants in the 
market. 
Claim payoffs can be winner take all (pays in full if the event occurs), conditional 
(pays off if the event occurs, and if another event occurs), indexed (pays $1 for each 
percentage of the event occurs; e.g., market share is X percent), or based on a spread 
(pays $2 if a threshold X is exceeded). Claims can be mutually exclusive (if A occurs, B 
does not occur) or bundled (in the case of indexed- or spread-based claims more than one 
                                                 
166 Gaspoz, Prediction Markets Supporting Technology, 93.  
167 Gaspoz, 94. 
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claim is paid and that any claim that beats the spread or exceeds the index are all paid). 
According to Ozan:  
When finding the probability of the future event is the main objective, 
winner-takes-all contract scheme designates the most direct approach. If 
the... analysts are interested in determining the mean value of an outcome 
than index contracts can provide the optimal performance…Spread 
contracts are used when median values are needed to be uncovered.168 
Settlement dates can be public or random and are either bound to a known end 
date (the date on which the result is known) or are on a date chosen by the market makers 
(random). The settlement judge is the authority who defines whether an event occurred. 
In the case of an election, it can be the news media or the relevant secretary of state. In 
the case of less well defined claims, it can be the newspaper of record, the relevant 
government agency, etc. As Gaspoz notes, “Claims could [payoff] regarding 
facts…proxies… in this case experts... [can] define the payoff for each claim… [or] the 
Volume Weighted Average Price…over the last five trading days” can be used to set 
payoffs.169  
4. Design of Practices in Managing Prediction Markets Investors 
(Participants) 
Traders are the investors in a prediction market. It is clear that the larger the 
community of traders, the more robust the prediction markets’ predictive prowess.170 
Table 8 describes design factors affecting how these investors and their participation in 
prediction markets can be managed. 
  
                                                 
168 Erol Ozan, Optimization of Information Technology Risk Event Prediction Markets (Greenville, 
NC: East Carolina University, 2013); Erol Ozan, “The Use of Prediction Markets in Information 
Technology Risk Management” (paper presented at American Society for Engineering Management 
Conference, Virginia Beach, VA, 2012), 2.  
169 Gaspoz, Prediction Markets Supporting Technology., 101. 
170 Joyce E. Berg, Forrest Nelson, and Thomas Rietz, Results from a Dozen Years of Election Futures 
Market Research, quoted in Gaspoz, Prediction Markets Supporting Technology, 98. 
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Table 8. Investor Management 






Display all information 












Informed versus non-informed 
Benefit from market outcome 
 
Prediction markets can be closed (participants are from a given community or are 
selected on some basis or affiliation) or open (open to the public). Furthermore, 
prediction markets are usually transparent (all available information is available to all 
traders). Yang, Li, and van Heck examined the implications of prediction market 
transparency and found that:  
Improved information transparency (disclosure of different traders’ buy 
and sell orders) can lead to higher levels of traders’ dynamic interactions. 
Increases in traders’ participation activity and dynamic interactions lead to 
higher information aggregation efficiency and greater market predictive 
accuracy.171  
However, available information can be restricted to achieve objectives, such as 
preventing the impacts of combinatorics, moral hazard, manipulation, hidden prices, and 
                                                 
171 Sheng-yun Yang, Tung Li, and Eric van Heck, “Information Transparency in Prediction Markets,” 
Decision Support Systems 78 (2015): 67.  
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decision selection bias.172 Investor anonymity is usually guaranteed by most public and 
private prediction markets to prevent the impacts of secret accounts, shared interests, etc.  
In terms of investor selection, as already stated, the more investors the better 
when it comes to the accuracy of predictions made using prediction markets. This “more 
is better” approach also applies to investor diversity. As to informed versus uninformed 
traders, and involving those who benefit from market outcomes, the literature suggests 
that both informed and uniformed traders are critical to a give prediction market’s 
predictive accuracy, while the impact of the latter has not been adequately explored. 
C. RELEVANT PRACTICES IN PREDICTION MARKETS DESIGN 
Practices in prediction markets design relevant to the proposed methodology 
developed in this thesis are summarized in Table 9 and discussed in the subsequent 
sections. These practices are chosen because they both reflect best practices as found in 
the literature and are specifically relevant to the proposed methodology.  
Table 9. Prediction Markets Design: Relevant Practices 
Prediction Markets Design: Relevant Practices 
Incentive 
Mechanisms 
Performance Performance evaluation Accuracy: best predictors 
Reward 
Reward type Non-Monetary 








Fees No Fees 
Market maker Dynamic pari-mutuel 
Trading time 24/7 
                                                 
172 Robin Hanson, “Impolite Innovation: The Technology and Politics of ‘Terrorism Futures’ and 
Other Decision Markets,” in Promoting the General Welfare, American Democracy and the Political 
Economy of Government Performance, ed. Eric Patashnik and Alan Gerber, 151–173 (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2006). 
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Prediction Markets Design: Relevant Practices 
Clearing House 
Order 
Order matching rules Price and quantity 




Short selling Allowed 
Asset 
Asset type Play money 
Inflation None 
Borrowing Margin purchases 
Endowment Initial endowment (money and/or contracts) 
Claim 
Claim IPO Screening 





Claim structure Independent 
Payoff 
Settlement date Public 
Settlement judge Sponsor 
Settlement price Final market price 
  Market Market policy Closed market 
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Prediction Markets Design: Relevant Practices 
Market transparency Display all information 
Investor 
Investor anonymity Username 






In terms of investment mechanisms, given that improved predictive accuracy is 
the overarching goal of this thesis methodology, evaluation of performance based on 
accuracy is the best possible option. Furthermore, due to practical and political reasons 
(participants earning monetary rewards if a “bad” outcome is predicted and comes to pass 
due to the possible action of the participant) coupled with the fact that the literature 
suggests no difference in accuracy if nonmonetary rewards are used, suggests that using 
non-monetary rewards is appropriate. Finally, tournament-based rewards earned by 
trading assets 24/7 can increase involvement (number of trades) due to the intrinsic value 
participants place on winning competitions and the increased availability and ease of 
participation (participants can participate whenever they have time available), 
respectively.  
The trading process uses DPM market makers, no fees, and 24/7 trading hours. 
The choice of the DPM is based in part on the assertion by Slamka, Skiera, and Spann, 
who assert, “The dynamic pari-mutuel market attains the highest forecasting accuracy, 
good robustness against parameter misspecification, the ability to incorporate new 
information into prices, and the lowest losses for operators.”173 The need for fees is 
                                                 
173 Slamka, Skiera, and Spann, “Prediction Market Performance,” 160. 
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negated by the reality that most extant prediction markets do not charge trading fees and 
the dearth of information on the impact of fees in this context in the literature. This 
researcher chose 24/7 trading due to its likely positive impact on participant involvement 
and the fact that such a structure allows for continuous price (prediction) discovery.  
The choice of clearinghouse characteristics is based on the fact that prediction 
markets are closely analogous to financial markets, and as is the case with financial 
markets, practices that encourage accurate price discovery and increase market efficiency 
(accuracy in the case of prediction markets) should result from the choices made. As a 
result, prediction markets clearinghouse practices that mimic those of financial markets 
(price and quantity-based order matching, no spending caps, allowing limit and market 
orders, allowing short selling, allowing margin purchases) can and should be 
implemented in the prediction market methodology this thesis proposes. The choice of 
play money as the yardstick by which participants’ predictive portfolios’ value is 
measured is driven by the fact that the literature suggests no appreciable difference in 
performance (accuracy) between prediction markets that use real money versus those that 
use play money.  
This researcher chose some clearinghouse practices unique to prediction markets 
(settlement dates, settlement judges, asset characteristics, claim characteristics) for 
inclusion in the methodology based on how they drive increased forecast accuracy. For 
example, the allowance of IPOs and conditional, index and spread-based contracts allow 
the prediction market sponsors to tailor the assets traded to the events simulated (e.g., the 
sponsors may create an asset that reflects a conditional event-if A happens, then B 
happens), or the sponsors may reflect new contracts for events that have not been 
included in the prediction market to date via the IPO process. In addition, not only does 
the choice of making each claim in the prediction market independent of other claims 
simplifies market functioning, it increases market transparency, and as a consequence, 
market efficiency and thus prediction market accuracy. Similarly, for the market to have 
public settlement dates and have the prediction market sponsor be the settlement judge, 
increases prediction market accuracy as well. The use of the final market price as the 
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settlement price ensures that market participants’ portfolios are priced in a way correctly 
reflecting their predictive accuracy over time.  
Finally, this researcher selected prediction market practices relating to investor 
management based on their consistency with the goal of outside participation driving the 
diversity of opinion. As discussed in the literature, it is likely that many of the recent 
failures of prediction markets to predict outcomes was likely due to insufficient diversity 
of participation and thus opinion among market participants. Investor (participant) 
anonymity is maintained to enable the free and transparent sharing of opinion while 
investor unicity is enforced to prevent one or a few investors from having multiple 
positions on the same event. Thus, the prediction market is not an exercise in hedging 
bets. The market is closed to allow the sponsors to control who participates, and as a 
result, to maintain or enhance the achievement of the goals of diversity in general, as well 
as maintain a mix of informed and uninformed participants. The latter allows the market 
sponsors to include opinion based on nonpublic sources, analogous to insider information 
in financial markets and to encourage strong form market efficiency, and as a result, 
increase predictive accuracy.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Design characteristics that drive the accuracy of prediction markets include 
incentive mechanisms, trading processes, clearing house design, and investor 
(participant) management processes. Although many possible variations of prediction 
markets design may be available, this chapter reviewed some of the most salient 
prediction markets characteristics and selected several design parameters for inclusion in 
the prediction markets design methodology that this thesis is developing. This researcher 
selected these parameters based on their likely impact on prediction market accuracy, as 
well as their impact on participant involvement and diversity (an indirect driver of 
prediction market accuracy). The choice of parameters also reflects a conscious attempt 
to model the design of existing financial markets. Indeed, given that the EMH in financial 
markets is the driver by analogy of prediction markets’ accuracy, the degree to which the 
prediction market design mimics that of financial markets is also a driver of prediction 
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market accuracy. Finally, this chapter included some examples of extant public and 
private prediction markets.  
Next, the thesis discusses how crowd- and prediction markets-based approaches 
can address the cultural factors driving analytic and forecast accuracy (or inaccuracy) in 
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
CULTURE FOR CROWDSOURCED AND PREDICTION 
MARKETS-BASED ANALYTIC METHODOLOGIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Any analytic methodology hoping to improve the predictive accuracy of the 
Intelligence Community analysts must both reflect and adapt to the underlying 
Intelligence Community culture. If this improvement does not occur, it is likely that any 
new or modified methodology either would be limited in its adoption, or more likely, be 
ignored by the analytic community at large. Furthermore, the processes and outcomes of 
intelligence analysis itself are strongly shaped by intelligence culture. Therefore, any 
proposed intelligence analytic methodology must address the challenges and limitations 
posed by intelligence culture as first discussed in Chapter II. This focus is especially true 
of crowd- and prediction markets-based methodologies, such as the one this thesis is 
developing. The fundamental and operational basis of how these types of methodologies 
work in practice addresses the cultural sources of intelligence community analytic and 
forecast inaccuracy. This chapter discusses how they do so in detail. However, these 
types of methodologies may nevertheless conflict with overarching intelligence 
community culture. For example, the Intelligence Community’s tendency to resist 
information sharing between agencies is a source of forecast inaccuracy that the 
methodology must address.  
This chapter considers how the crowd and prediction markets analytic and 
forecast methodology addresses salient Intelligence Community cultural factors leading 
to forecast inaccuracy. This discussion also provides context for the next chapter, which 
builds on the work presented in the thesis to this point and discusses the specifics of a 
proposed crowd-based prediction markets forecasting methodology driving improved 
intelligence community forecasting and analysis.  
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B. THE NATURE OF THE OVERARCHING INTELLIGENCE CULTURE 
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CROWDSOURCED AND PREDICTION 
MARKETS-BASED ANALYTIC METHODOLOGIES 
The examination of what intelligence is and its implications for analysis and 
analysts, which Chapter II discusses, strongly suggests that the proposed analytic 
methodology must be able to cope with or indeed thrive on taking in, processing, and 
drawing conclusions from a large volume of information from disparate sources and in a 
wide variety of formats. Furthermore, the methodology must have mechanisms to address 
the fact that forecasts will likely be based on a significantly incomplete and vague set of 
facts whose accuracy is indeterminate. It also must be able to cope with the reality of 
limited available feedback in the short term to refine the analysis and associated forecast. 
Moreover, the methodology must explicitly address the fact that the availability of input 
information may suffer from the consequences of the “need to know” and limited 
distribution approaches to information sharing and dissemination, as well as the 
consequences of the “information is power” thought pattern at each agency. 
Crowd and prediction markets-based analytic and forecasting methodologies 
address these issues head on. First, the nature of crowd-based prediction markets revolves 
around distilling all information available to all participants in the market into one thing, 
the price of the outcome or asset (or in other words, the instantaneous likelihood of the 
outcome occurring). An attribute of crowd-based prediction markets is that they can do 
this extraction without the need for intensive analysis or active management on the part 
of the market sponsor. The choices made by individual market participants as to how they 
price a given outcome or asset causes the market to make an instantaneous assessment of 
the aggregate likelihood of that event or outcome occurring through the “magic” of the 
market, namely the interaction of supply and demand. In addition, the estimate is likely to 
incorporate large volumes of information from disparate sources since the individual’s 
participation in the marketplace makes trading decisions based on the information 
available to them. With a sufficiently diverse pool of active market participants, each 
with an endowment of information that may or may not be the same as other participants’ 
endowments, the market price can capture the entire universe of available information on 
a given topic (a result of the EMH discussed in Chapter II).  
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Second, crowd-based prediction markets are uniquely suited to addressing 
situations wherein the available information on a given event or outcome is vague, 
limited, or has gaps. This situation occurs for three reasons. First, individual participants 
in the prediction market are endowed with different information sets, and thus, it is likely 
that information gaps faced by one participant may not be faced by other participants or 
each participant may have different information gaps. Given that the market’s forecast is 
based on aggregate results of individual trading decisions, these gaps may be offset and 
result in the forecast by the market as a whole being based on a nearly complete set of 
information.  
Third, if all participants in the market face the same information gap, all 
participants then apply their own mental models and heuristics to close the gap as trading 
decisions are made, which would result in the market generating an aggregate forecast 
reflecting the consensus of the market participants in how to close or address the global 
information gap. This phenomenon has important implications because if the market 
participants are not sufficiently diverse in information endowments and analytic prowess, 
the predictive accuracy of the market may be diminished. In the case of gaps that reflect 
unknown unknowns, the EMH suggests that prediction markets can capture the instincts 
or desires of the participants through their trading behavior, such that the likely impacts 
of unknown unknowns are included in the market forecasts. 
Fourth, crowd-based prediction markets address the issue of limited feedback in 
traditional intelligence analysis due to their very nature. The evolution of the price of an 
asset and associated likelihood of an event as it evolves through time is an instantaneous 
assessment of the probability of that event at any given point in time until the contract 
expires (the event does or does not occur). Market participants can watch how the price 
of the asset is evolving and either use analysis or make educated guesses about why the 
particular pattern of changes in price is taking place and revise their trading decisions 
accordingly. The market price is an instantaneous measure of the probability of an event, 
and its evolution over time is in itself feedback that drives revisions of trading behavior 
by market participants that reflects new or additional information as it arrives. 
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Finally, issues related to the availability of input information suffering from the 
consequences of the “need to know” and limited distribution approaches to information 
sharing and dissemination, as well as the consequences of the “information is power” 
thought pattern at each agency, are addressed via the diverse nature of crowd-based 
prediction markets. If the crowdsponsor choses the crowd correctly, some participants are 
then “inside the wall” and have the need to know to access closely held sources of 
information while others do not. The prediction markets-based forecast therefore benefits 
from participants who have access to privileged information while at the same time 
incorporating the beliefs and analysis of those who do not have such access. The 
information set used to drive the market’s forecasts thus becomes global and does not 
suffer from agency-based parochiality or the consequences of a need to know or a limited 
distribution of information. However, an agency overseeing the development of forecasts 
using the proposed methodology is still necessary. Under the proposed methodology, the 
prediction market will be sponsored by an agency or agencies, but the information 
driving the working of the market will be global and include a myriad of sources outside 
the sponsoring agency (or agencies),  
C. THE NATURE OF THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYTIC CULTURE AND 
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CROWDSOURCED AND PREDICTION 
MARKETS-BASED ANALYTIC METHODOLOGIES 
In terms of analytic process, a successful methodology addresses or otherwise 
works around the implications of a culture characterized by emphasizing tradecraft to the 
detriment of more scientific analytic methods, problems related to the role of experts and 
expertise, cognitive bias, and according to Hare and Collinson, “extreme time constraints; 
focus on current production; the rewards and incentives”174 for analysts, norms and 
taboos, the impact of secrecy, and finally, the analyst’s identity and training. Each of 
these challenges can be addressed by the appropriate methodological design of the 
crowd-based prediction market and are discussed in detail in the next sections. 
                                                 
174 Hare and Collinson, “Organisational Culture and Intelligence Analysis,” 217–218. 
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1. Implications of the Emphasis on Tradecraft and Expertise  
The proposed methodology can address the emphasis on tradecraft, and as a 
consequence, the lack of transparent, scientific-like analytic processes as follows. If the 
methodology used to improve predictive accuracy is based on using analytic results as an 
input, as is the case with crowd-based prediction markets, the underlying method used to 
generate inputs, be it tradecraft or more scientific methods, becomes irrelevant. This lack 
of relevance results because the key to the success of the prediction market-based 
forecasting effort is the input itself, not how it is generated. Market participants can and 
likely will use different and multiple methods to drive their trading decisions. All market 
participants may use Intelligence Community tradecraft-based analysis to drive their 
trading behavior or may use other analytic techniques of varying degrees of scientific 
rigor to support their input decisions. In either case, the crowd-based prediction market 
will aggregate results and generate a consensus forecast. The added benefit is that the 
market forecast will incorporate the results of the application of open-source analytic 
techniques, which in some ways, may be of equal or greater analytic power than 
traditional intelligence analytic tradecraft as well.  
The role of experts is more problematic. Crowd-based prediction markets address 
this issue by anonymizing the source of the input data. Given that market participants can 
only see the aggregate behavior of the forecast embodied in the asset’s market price, it is 
not possible to parse out the contribution of individual participants in the markets 
whether they are experts or not. Furthermore, the very diversity of prediction markets 
participants ensures that the analytic sclerosis associated with experts and expertise does 
not have an outsize impact; market participants have their own mental models and 
heuristics and all participants’ inputs are weighted equally in the market’s forecast. 
Crowd-based prediction markets also offer the opportunity to select market participants 
based on each individual participant’s proven forecasting prowess by using a “warmup 
exercise” that will be open to all and in which participation in a prediction market tests 
and validates each participant’s predictive skills. Then, the subset truly demonstrated to 
be superforecasters due to their predictive prowess in the warmup is tasked with making 
the actual predictions that are inputs to the “real” thing. Finally, psychological and 
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general knowledge tests can be used to screen for those who, according to Tetlock and 
Gardner are:  
Better at inductive reasoning, pattern detection, cognitive flexibility, and 
open-mindedness…. [and have a] greater understanding of geopolitics, 
training in probabilistic reasoning, and opportunities to succeed in 
cognitively enriched team environments….and [who] viewed forecasting 
as a skill that required deliberate practice, sustained effort, and constant 
monitoring of current affairs.175 
Thus, identifying and selecting those with personal characteristics is strongly correlated 
with forecasting prowess for participation in the actual prediction market. 
2. Implications of Cognitive Biases  
Cognitive biases can be addressed by applying the crowd-based prediction 
markets methodology via training, the choice of participants (utilizing experts or not), 
and by having the methodology rely on the nature of probability and statistics to address 
biases. Prior to participation, prediction market participants can undergo a short period of 
training in which they receive education in basic probability and statistics and become 
familiar with typical cognitive biases and how to avoid them. The literature reveals this 
comparatively cursory level of training to increase market superforecasters’ predictive 
prowess. Superforecasters who have undergone this level of training often have forecast 
accuracies that often exceed those of professional analysts by 30 percent or more.176  
To address the issues with experts and expertise, the proposed methodology may 
include a diverse pool of prediction markets participants that includes, but is not 
dominated by, those the Intelligence Community regards as experts. Indeed, the 
performance of the experts as opposed to lay forecasters and superforecasters in the 
prediction market may allow the development of weighting schemes whereby the 
forecasts of market participants with superior forecast accuracy have a greater weight in 
the market. Participant diversity minimizes the impact of cognitive biases in a prediction 
markets-based forecasting methodology. A sufficiently diverse prediction market will 
                                                 
175 Tetlock and Gardner, Superforecasting, 181.  
176 Ungar et al., The Good Judgment Project, 38–41. 
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contain participants whose cognitive biases are not all the same or even moderately 
correlated. As a result, the impact of the biases should offset each other and result in the 
market’s aggregate forecast converging to a value minimizing the impacts of cognitive 
biases. Finally, combining forecasts from different prediction markets or from the 
prediction market and traditional intelligence community analysis should lead to 
significantly improved forecast accuracy. This aim will be achieved by having the 
methodology use multiple forecasts from different sources as inputs to average out the 
impact of cognitive biases as long as the input forecasts are independent and 
uncorrelated.  
3. Implications of Time Constraints and the Tyranny of Production  
The methodological design of the crowd-based prediction market can address the 
impact of severe time constraints. Prediction markets produce results reflecting the latest 
information at a given point in time, and any one-time snapshot of its outputs will be just 
that, a snapshot in time. The continuous nature of the prediction market’s analytic results 
over time means that the analysts can simply look up the current state of a prediction as 
often as they like, which eliminates the impact of time pressure that results with one-time 
products or with periodic products prepared on short timelines. This approach also 
addresses the tyranny of the need to produce and update products constantly in real time 
because the forecasts embodied in the market evolve constantly as new information 
arrives. 
One potential criticism of the prediction markets-based approach is that the tasks 
are seemingly binary; an event happens or does not happen, and the price of that event or 
asset in a prediction market is an instantaneous estimate of the likelihood of that event at 
a given point in time. This approach seemingly implies that the complexity of analytic 
tasks that can be performed by a prediction market is limited to simple binary tasks, 
which is not true for the following reasons. First, complex tasks can be modular and 
nested, in that they can be decomposed into individual tasks each reflecting binary choice 
that aggregates up into an overall forecast. Second, the asset can be designed to reflect 
conditionality; if event A happens then event B happens with a certain probability. Third, 
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tasks can be set up to assess the likelihood that a threshold will be exceeded. For 
example, what is the probability of a North Korean missile with over a 3,000 nautical 
mile range? Generally speaking, appropriate task design can address the issue of task 
complexity when using a crowd-based prediction markets forecasting methodology. 
4. Implications of Rewards and Incentives 
A crowd-based prediction markets methodology also addresses the issue of 
rewards and incentives. Explicit, rigorous, backward-looking (quantitative not 
qualitative) analysis of the accuracy and relevance of forecasts in a public manner is 
allowed. Market participants can earn non-monetary rewards (mission badges, points, 
game rankings etc.) as a direct consequence of their forecasting success. In this way, 
tying each market participant’s incentive structure to each forecast is encouraged, which 
leads to analytic accuracy and relevance. Chapter VI expands on how the thesis 
methodology operationalizes this concept.  
5. Implications of Taboos and Secrecy 
Given the information and analysis Chapter II presents, a complete 
methodological solution to the issue of the taboo against changing, reversing, or 
otherwise straying from the agency position, regardless of new or even contradictory 
information, is unlikely. A cultural change on the part of policy makers and agency 
managers and leadership addressing the fact that a well-reasoned and supported change in 
position actually increases predictive accuracy is necessary to overcome this obstacle.  
The proposed methodology addresses the issue of secrecy and the primacy of 
secret or covert information in analysis because prediction markets inputs are analytic 
results, and the source of those inputs is irrelevant to the market outcome. The market 
does not care what drives an individual participant’s trading decisions; just that the 
decisions are made and acted upon. Thus, those with access to secret information and 
analysis can use that information and analysis to guide their trading behavior, while 
others can rely on open source or even commercial information as an input to drive theirs. 
The market then aggregates information from all sources available to market participants, 
whether based on closely held information or not, and generates a consensus estimate.  
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The forecast aggregation feature of prediction markets may also allow the use of 
weighting schemes whereby the forecasts made by market participants with a 
quantitatively demonstrated track record of forecast success can be given greater weight 
in the market. Thus, if those participants with access to secret information and analysis do 
indeed demonstrate a better track record of success, their inputs can then be more heavily 
weighted as the market aggregates its forecast. This approach has the disadvantage of 
potentially causing bias in the forecast, as the forecasts of experts with access to secret 
information are given greater emphasis. However, the efficacy of such weighting 
schemes can be tested as the Intelligence Community implements the methodology, and 
if successful, the community can replicate the weight schemes. Such a precedent already 
exists in the financial markets. By their nature, high volume (in dollar value) traders have 
an outsize impact in determining the course of the market, as smaller investors attempt to 
follow the market leaders, and as algorithms that base their trading behavior on trading 
patterns in the market as a whole do their work.  
6. Implications of Analysts’ Identity and Training 
Issues related to the intelligence analysts’ identity are also hard to address using a 
crowd-based prediction markets methodology. The issue of identity is exacerbated by the 
fact that generalists (some of whom are outside the Intelligence Community) probably 
have an active role in operationalizing the methodology. Furthermore, the possibility that 
non-experts can outperform the experts within the Intelligence Community (see the 
section on the Good Judgment Project in Chapter II) will exacerbate this problem. An 
appeal to the agency mission of providing the most accurate information possible may 
address some of these issues. 
The issue of training is similar to that of identity in its implications. Since the best 
forecasters benefit from formal training in probability and statistics, and in how to 
address the potential for cognitive biases,177 limited formal training may be one way to 
address this issue. Furthermore, if the methodology uses analytic results as an input, the 
underlying differences in training, and as a result analytic approaches, becomes irrelevant 
                                                 
177 Mellers et al., “The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis,” 6–12. 
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as the methodology is a black box that takes the results of analysis as its input and 
produces predictions as an output without having to consider the issues caused by 
different training standards and practices. 
D. ADDRESSING THE INTELLIGENCE CONSUMERS’ LIKELY 
CONCERNS 
Consumers of intelligence products derived from the results of crowd-based 
prediction markets very likely would have concerns about how the products were 
developed and their reliability. These concerns would likely arise from the following:  
• Although sponsored by an agency or agencies, in some sense, no one and 
everyone develops the prediction markets-based estimates; the prediction 
market’s estimate is not traceable to specific analysts or to specific sources 
or methods. Obviously an issue, the consumer of the intelligence forecast 
would likely require the estimate to a source or sources be traced for 
purposes of accountability.  
• The information set prediction markets participants use to develop the 
estimate is in some sense unknown.  
• Limited tools are available to generate confidence measures for the 
estimates.  
• The estimate may radically conflict with existing agency positions.  
Each of these issues can be addressed by educating the consumer. Consumers 
have to be convinced of the utility, efficacy, and applicability of prediction markets-based 
estimates to have them sponsor the prediction markets as described in Chapters VI and 
VII. First, prediction markets are just one technique. Analysts should create a mosaic 
using the results of different techniques weighted by a track record to develop the 
products being presented to the consumer. Consideration of the impact of combining 
independent forecasts in Chapter II of this thesis demonstrates the robustness of this 
approach. Second, given that a prediction market can be designed to aggregate all 
available information on a topic, including open source and non-public information, it is 
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likely that the prediction market estimate is a better representation of the global 
consensus view on a given question than analysis performed by a single or a few analysts 
using a limited set of analytic techniques. The track record in terms of prediction market 
accuracy in other contexts supports this view as well. Furthermore, the lack of 
traceability to specific individuals, sources, or methods is actually a positive in that 
prediction markets address the biases inherent in basing the analytic process on limited 
information sets or a few analysts and analytic techniques. The confidence level of the 
prediction markets-based estimate can be approximated based on volatility over time of 
the prediction market estimate itself or by comparing it to the historical track record. 
Finally, in the cases in which the prediction market results differ from long-held agency 
positions, such disagreement can be a warning that the global consensus on a topic is 
different from the agency viewpoint and drive further analysis using non-prediction 
markets-based techniques. In sum, prediction markets-based estimates are yet another 
tool in the analysts toolkit; albeit one with great potential.  
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed how crowd-based prediction markets methodologies 
address and potentially solve the problems posed by many of the culturally driven 
sources of intelligence community forecast and analytic inaccuracy Chapter II first 
identifies. The next chapter discusses the specifics of a crowd-based prediction markets 
forecasting methodology that drives improved intelligence community forecasting and 
analysis that builds on the work of Chapters III and IV. Note that the methodology 
proposed in the next chapter generates probabilistic forecasts that are then incorporated 
into usable intelligence community products, such as narrative reports, numerical charts 
and tables, spreadsheets and graphs, spot advisory “flash” reports, and status boards. 
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VI. A METHODOLOGY FOR IMPROVING FORECAST 
ACCURACY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes a proposed methodology for improving intelligence 
community forecast accuracy. The work in the previous chapters centered on the 
implications of combining forecasts, the importance of Intelligence Community culture 
for analytic methodologies, and on crowdsourcing and predictions markets; all of which 
are inputs for the proposed methodology. In particular, this chapter discusses the 
characteristics of the proposed crowd, the proposed structure of the forecasting effort, the 
proposed incentive structure, the proposed task design, the proposed prediction market 
design and associated structural parameters underlying the forecasting effort, and the key 
characteristics of the proposed platform used to implement the prediction market. The 
goal of this chapter is to use all these critical concepts to design a methodology—a 
crowd-sourced forecasting tournament—that can be used by the U.S. Intelligence 
Community to improve its forecast accuracy. The first section provides an overview of 
the tournament and a real-world example of the application of the tournament in an 
intelligence context, while later sections describe each major aspect of the methodology 
previously mentioned in detail. 
B. A CROWD-SOURCING TOURNAMENT  
The existing research on crowdsourcing and prediction markets strongly suggests 
that the Intelligence Community can improve its forecast accuracy by sponsoring a 
crowdsourcing tournament in which a specially recruited group of individuals (the 
crowd) compete to make forecasts about future events of strategic significance.  
During the tournament, the crowd uses their assessments about the intelligence 
question posed by the tournament sponsor as inputs to their trades on a prediction market 
on an asset embodying the sponsor’s question (see Chapter IV). The likelihood of a given 
outcome (or answer to the question posed) at any point in time until whether or not the 
event has happened can be assessed is given by the instantaneous price of the contract 
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embodying that event in the prediction market. The structure of the proposed tournament 
and the underlying prediction market this chapter discusses is adjusted to fit the nature 
and culture of intelligence agencies and personnel (discussed in Chapters II and V).  
The utility of this approach to forecasting can be illustrated using an example. 
Suppose someone wants to understand the current state of the North Korean nuclear 
program. Given recent events, potential questions to the crowd may include:178  
• Will President Kim meet with President Trump in the next three months? 
• If a summit between the presidents occurs, what are the implications of the 
summit for North Korea’s nuclear program? 
• claim of complete denuclearization by North Korea 
• phased denuclearization by North Korea 
• admission of independent verifiers to verify denuclearization by 
North Korea 
• summit failure; no agreement reached 
• Will the North Koreans resume testing nuclear weapons? 
• if the summit fails 
• breakout after making an agreement at the summit 
• When will they resume testing nuclear weapons? 
• If they resume testing, what size will the test be? 
In each case, the crowdsourced prediction market provides a likelihood of these 
events coming to pass. Note that this set of questions does not address the why’s of the 
various courses of action listed. To elicit these responses, the questions must be modified 
to provide options as to the underlying reasons for the event. Take summit failure, for 
example. The summit can fail for many reasons, and the plausibility of alternative 
                                                 
178 This example was drafted before the Trump-Kim summit in Singapore in June 2018.  
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reasons for summit failure can be tested using the prediction market. One example to 
consider in this context is: 
• The summit between the two presidents fails because: 
• President Kim withdraws from negotiations: 
• China pressures Kim not to take the deal on the offer. 
• Meaning of denuclearization to both sides is different. 
• Insufficient economic incentives are given to Kim. 
• President Trump withdraws: 
• North Korean terms are unacceptable. 
• Requires time-phased denuclearization. 
• United States asked to exit the Korean Peninsula. 
In this case, the crowd-based prediction market assesses both the overall odds of 
summit failure, as well as gives rank-ordered reasons as to why the summit has failed. 
Choices different from those in the question design can be captured. In addition, another 
set of questions can be posed in a similar vein that probes for the evidence supporting 
each assessment made. 
The methodology this thesis describes is both distinct from and an extension of 
other efforts in this area, such as the Good Judgment Project due to the following. 
• The methodology uses a warm-up tournament to select the best forecasters 
from the crowd both within and outside the Intelligence Community, and 
possibly, subsequently limits participation to these superforecasters. 
• The methodology uses iterative tournaments with periodic redesign. After 
the initial warm-up tournaments, sponsors redesign subsequent 
tournaments as needed and iterated on a six-month cycle. 
• Sponsors adjust the choice of crowd in each iteration of the tournament 
based on actual forecasting success. 
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• The methodology tests what drives superior forecasting (question design, 
choice of crowd, teaming, training, experience, education, etc.) and upon 
identification of key drivers for forecasting success, iterates prediction 
market parameters as a whole to take advantage of the testing results.  
• The methodology uses questions (prediction market asset or contract) 
designed to elicit not only the likelihood of an event but also both a rank-
ordered list of underlying reasons for that event, as well as an assessment 
of the evidence supporting the reasons given.  
• The methodology balances the need for simplicity against the need for 
complex question design by using a survey like frontend to elicit 
participants’ assessments about the questions posed.  
• The methodology makes extensive use of gamification.  
• The methodology allows for teaming.  
• The methodology uses commercial-off-the-shelf platforms to support and 
manage the prediction market.  
This chapter proposes that the Intelligence Community use rolling six-month 
tournaments with an initial (practice) warm-up tournament followed by subsequent 
iterations of the actual tournament itself. The warm-up tournament serves both to 
familiarize participants with the structure and operation of the prediction market and to 
identify the best forecasters to be selected to participate in subsequent tournament rounds.  
During each round of the tournament, participants trade contracts or assets 
embodying questions about real-world outcomes of events on a prediction market. 
Participant’s performance (relative forecast accuracy) in each round may in part 
determine whether the participant is invited back to participate in subsequent rounds. 
During each round, statistical testing is used to identify likely drivers of realized forecast 
accuracy and that information is used to inform redesigns of crowd choice and of both the 
question and prediction market design to improve forecast accuracy further. The added 
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advantage is that the relative merits of each component of the methodology can be 
understood fairly quickly and real-time redesigns done to address the inevitable frictions 
seen in the real-world possible. 
Finally, the relative merits of the methodology in improving forecast accuracy 
becomes clear very quickly. When measured over two rounds beyond the initial warm-up 
round, if the iterative redesigns are not significantly improving forecast accuracy 
compared to traditional open or closed source forecasting methods, then the effort is 
quickly halted before it uses undue resources.  
C. CHOOSING THE CROWD 
Since the proposed methodology employs crowd-sourcing, the choice of who is in 
the crowd is critical to forecast accuracy. For the methodology to be effective, the crowd 
must be diverse, comparatively large, and well-motivated. The crowd should include 
“non-experts, experts, informal members, customers, business partners, etc.,” and it must 
vary in “size, composition, uniformity, and level of expertise.”179 Also, given that tasks 
are designed for individuals and for teams, choices in terms of how teams are formed are 
also critical. 
Diversity in the crowd can be addressed by targeting multiple markets segments 
for the crowdsourcing effort envisaged under the methodology. Obvious communities to 
be targeted as part of implementing the methodology include intelligence analysts, 
business intelligence analysts, journalists, think tank staff, and political science and 
international relations students and faculty. Less obvious target communities include 
students and faculty in the social science community (e.g., economics, anthropology, 
language), engineers, health care professionals, epidemiologists, weather forecasters, etc. 
The lay public should also be included.  
The methodology should encourage teaming, and participants should be allowed 
to participate in implementing the methodology both as teams and as individuals. This 
team participation can involve participants either forming their own teams, or by 
                                                 
179 Chiu, Liang, and Turban. “What Can Crowdsourcing Do?” 43.  
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expressing a willingness to participate on teams formed by the group implementing the 
methodology. It is critical that the crowdsourcerss sustain the outreach effort as the 
forecasting tournament proceeds. Sufficient diversity and largeness of numbers 
throughout each forecast cycle and the continued engagement of superforecasters, 
identified as the tournament proceeds, is critical to successful forecast elicitation. 
Part of the outreach to crowdsourcees envisaged in this methodology’s 
implementation requires gathering detailed data on the potential crowd using survey tools 
for such issues as geographic location, areas of interest, gender, level of education, type 
of education, subject matter knowledge, degree of analytic expertise, degree of formal 
training in probability and statistics, years on the job, etc. Other areas the crowdsourcers 
should consider include self-perceived competence, comfort with collaboration, 
motivation to volunteer, degree of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, drivers of mental 
satisfaction, degree of self-perceived self-esteem, level of development of personal skills, 
degree of comfort with knowledge sharing, and degree of love of community. During the 
warm-up tournament, the crowdsourcers use statistical testing to identify the 
demographic and psychographic attributes of forecasters associated with forecast 
accuracy using the completed surveys. This testing may be used to inform the selection of 
participants in subsequent rounds of the forecast tournament. This testing also enables the 
implementers of the methodology to assess the diversity of the potential crowd and make 
adjustments in terms of increased outreach to given market segments or task 
reformulation or elimination as needed. Ideally, participants exhibit sufficient diversity 
for each task, while at the same time, the group is large enough to elicit meaningful 
results.  
Under the methodology, members of the crowd can choose which tasks they 
participate in, both individually, and as part of a team. Indeed, if it turns out that an 
insufficiently diverse crowd “opts in” to a given task, the crowdsourcers may either drop 
the task from consideration or re-formulate the task and task design to make it appealing 
to a more diverse crowd.  
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D. TOURNAMENT STRUCTURE 
Six-month forecast cycles form the overarching structure of the forecast 
elicitation methodology. At the beginning of each forecast cycle, individuals and teams 
are endowed with a stock of play money with which to buy into contracts associated with 
tasks (each task or task set has a traded contract associated with its outcome). Earnings 
from previous forecast cycles (the portfolio value at the end of a given cycle) are added to 
this endowment to allow for forecasters not successful in making forecasts in a given 
round to participate in subsequent rounds, as well as those who have been successful 
(have a positive portfolio value at the end of a forecast cycle). This result is important for 
three reasons. First, uninformed or unsuccessful traders add information to the prediction 
market regardless of their success or failure. Second, competition is engendered, as well 
as perhaps a willingness to keep participating even after an initial failure. Third, a track 
record of success leads to greater rewards.  
Note that prior to the start of the tournament proper, individuals and teams can 
participate in a six-month warmup forecast cycle. The crowdsourcers use the 
performance in this cycle to identify and select potential superforecasters and to create 
teams of superforecasters to play in the forecast tournament proper. The warmup 
tournament also allows the crowdsourcers to work through alternative task designs, how 
to opt in or opt out of tasks (they only have to buy or not buy or short a given contract 
associated with a task), and identify any task design related issues prior to starting the 
tournament proper. At this time, participants also are given the chance to take basic 
training in probability and statistics and to complete the psychographic questionnaire, 
which is used to assess adequate diversity on each task. In addition, participants become 
familiar with the tournament platform, how to trade on their predictions, and the reward 
structure and game elements. The methodology assumes a certain amount of financial 
acumen regarding how financial markets work in terms of buying and selling, market and 
limit orders, and shorting and buying on margin, but the crowdsources provide an online 
self-paced training and instructor-led webinars on these topics. 
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E. INCENTIVE STRUCTURE 
The proposed methodology gives paying individuals play money for forecasting 
success as a measure and metric of an individual or team’s success. The choice of play 
money as an incentive is deliberate as the literature has not demonstrated a difference in 
outcomes that depends on whether real or play money is used. The perception that the 
Intelligence Community is paying participants to gamble and all the consequences the 
realization of that reality entails is avoided. At the end of each forecast period (every six 
months), the crowdsourcers assess value of an individual or team’s play money forecast 
portfolio and the individual (or team) can redeem it for nominal real prizes. The five best 
forecasters, as measured by portfolio value, also receive pro-rated shares (with a 5–4-3-2-
1 prorating scheme) of a play money for X prize. The forecasting rounds (six-month 
tournaments) are also gamified to the extent possible. The gamification takes the form of 
an individual and team play money portfolio value leaderboard. Individuals and teams 
earn play money, not only based on the value of their forecast portfolio, but also on their 
degree of participation in each round and on the complexity of the task they undertake 
(more complex forecasting tasks pay a variable bonus depending on complexity for 
forecasts with one standard deviation of the reality).  
A final game element consists of different missions that crowdsourcees can 
undertake. For example, envision a North Korea mission area, for which crowdsourcees 
can earn mission badges for participating frequently and effectively in a given number of 
forecasting activities related to North Korea. Alternatively, a mission area for each area 
of subject matter expertise can be created. Moreover, crowdsourcees can undertake 
multiple missions with play money bonuses as awards for mission completion. 
Leaders in the Intelligence Community may initially object to the notion of 
“intelligence forecasting as a game,” as the stakes are so high in terms of how 
consequential Intelligence Community forecasts are. As referred to in several sources, the 
counterargument to this objection is based on the demonstrated ability of prediction 
markets to elicit highly accurate forecasts in other contexts and on the reality that the 
success or failure of the methodology in improving forecast accuracy is both 
unambiguous and quickly clear. Furthermore, an argument can be made that the 
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gamification of tasks as proposed in this methodology has cracked hitherto intractable 
problems like optimal protein folding in the biosciences and the identification of certain 
astronomical objects in astronomy.180  
F. TASK DESIGN 
Task design is critical to the success or failure of the methodology. Proper task 
design allows independently determined multiple forecasts to be created and forecasts to 
be combined to improve accuracy in play. Furthermore, it is then possible to determine 
what works and what does not in terms of task design as the results from the 
crowdsourcing effort come in; thereby, the operationalized task design can be revised to 
engender the best forecast results.  
Crowdsourcers may design tasks to be atomic (that is indivisible) and may 
involve varying degrees of complexity both in terms of the required results and the 
complexity of analysis necessary to formulate those results. Tasks, such as estimating the 
probability of a nuclear weapons test by North Korea (for example), are on the surface 
atomic; the crowdsourcees only have to estimate the likelihood based on their judgment. 
However, if the task is broken down into subtasks, each of which requires an independent 
estimate as an output (and as an input into the next higher order task), then the formerly 
atomic task becomes much more complex. For example, if instead of asking what the 
probability of a nuclear test is within a given timeframe, the task instead estimates the 
conditional probability of a nuclear test’s kilo-tonnage, exceeding a given threshold if the 
test occurs, and if the test occurs and exceeds a given threshold, that test is conducted 
using a missile, then the formerly atomic task has become granular.  
Thus, tasks in the proposed methodology consist of participants estimating “one 
shot” probabilities of individual, unique events, estimating conditional probabilities for 
event sequences, estimating when an outcome exceeds a threshold, and estimating the 
                                                 
180 “Solve Puzzles for Science,” Fold-it, accessed June 12, 2018, https://fold.it/portal/; Alan Boyle, 
“Gamers Solve Molecular Puzzle that Baffled Scientists,” NBC News, November 2, 2015, https://www. 
nbcnews.com/science/science-news/gamers-solve-molecular-puzzle-baffled-scientists-f6C10402813; 
Matias Celasco, Juan Ignacio Yanez, and Roberto Gamen, “Galaxy Conqueror: Astronomy, Citizens, and 
Gamification,” in 2016 XI Latin American Conference on Learning Objects and Technology (LACLO) (San 
Carlos, Costa Rica: IEEE, 2016), doi: 10.1109/LACLO.2016.7751798.  
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likelihood and extent of forecast errors. The payoffs of individuals’ tasks are suited to a 
winner-takes-all approach in this case. If the task involves determining the mean value of 
an outcome (e.g., how many kilotons equivalent a given nuclear test is or the median 
value for the amount of counterfeit currency manufactured by North Korea is in 
circulation), the crowdsourcers then incorporate the indices and spreads, respectively, 
into the task design (in other words, the payoff for the successful completion of the task 
is measured against the extent to which the predicted value exceeds an index or the size 
of the spread between the predicted value and the expected value, respectively). 
Crowdsourcers can also design tasks to be allocated to both individuals and 
teams. Although the warmup tournaments proposed as part of the methodology identify 
superforecasters within each crowd segment, it may also be possible for teams of 
superforecasters to perform even better than individual superforecasters alone. To this 
end, in the case of individual tasks, no coordination or communication with others is 
required, as opposed to team tasks where teams coordinate and post a team consensus 
answer to estimation tasks. Teams are better suited to address complex analytic tasks 
(ones that involve several conditional events or ones that involve estimating spreads or 
multiple simultaneous thresholds), both due to the level of effort complex analytic tasks 
require and the complexity of analysis they require to generate inputs. On the other hand, 
crowdsourcers can design individual tasks to be as atomic as possible, which allow 
individuals to address credibly the task without an excessive use of resources, such as 
time and analytic effort. Two potential useful outcomes can result. First, in the case of 
tasks for individuals, all participants can apply their own expertise and knowledgebase to 
making the estimate independently of others in the effort. Thus, multiple independent 
estimates can be created and combined, which then results in increased forecast accuracy 
on average. Second, in the case of team tasks, depending on the choice of team 
composition, information that may be unavailable to the many may be incorporated into 
the team estimates, as each team member may have access to different knowledge and 
experience bases (e.g., classified information and the analytic process used in intelligence 
analysis), and the team estimate itself may be less likely to suffer from cognitive biases 
due to the diversity of team members’ interactions, experience, and inputs.  
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Finally, crowdsourcers can design the degree of structuring of tasks to vary to 
allow both individuals and teams to test existing analytic approaches. In the case of 
structured approaches, the task is broken down into a set of discrete subtasks, the results 
of which serve as inputs to higher order subtasks, which in turn, serve as inputs to the 
final result. As far as possible, the structuring of the tasks and subtasks reflect analytic 
best practices of the Intelligence Community. Crowdsourcers address unstructured tasks 
by having the participants assess the top line question, without having to go through a 
series of structured subtasks first that then tests the impact of analytic design on forecast 
accuracy.  
G. PREDICTION MARKET STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS 
The incentive structure under this methodology requires the implementation of 
structures related to performance measurement, rewards, and involvements. 
Crowdsourcers evaluate performance based on the value of an individual or team’s play 
money portfolio. Portfolio value consists of the value of assets being traded or expired 
options (over 80 percent), play money awards based on effort (number of trades, training 
completed) (five percent), and play money awards based on mission completion and 
based on task complexity (15 percent). Hopefully, the methodology will then ensure 
sufficient incentive to motivate engagement, that the level of work required for 
participation is manageable, and that adequate reciprocity occurs between the 
crowdsourcers and crowdsourcees. 
The trading process used under the methodology is as follows. First, fees for 
trading and IPOs, and an expiration are not imposed. As discussed in Chapter IV, the 
impact of implementing trading fees (primarily to prevent bubbles) is not well 
understood, and the fact that most extant and past prediction markets do not impose such 
fees suggests that the methodology need not operationalize this aspect of prediction 
market design. Second, to encourage participation, crowdsourcees are allowed to trade 
24/7, both enabling ease of participation and also encouraging prompt price discovery. 
Third, due to liquidity concerns (thin trading may be a possibility on some tasks), a DPM 
trading mechanism should be used. Finally, the crowdsourcers or crowdsourcees can 
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generate new prediction tasks through the IPO process. In the case of crowdsourcers, they 
simply add another contract to the market traded at some IPO price that can be 
determined by a variety of methods, including expert judgment, consensus forecasts, and 
the like. In the case of crowdsources, new forecasts are accommodated by having players 
propose an IPO. If players place sufficient orders for the asset (prediction) as defined by 
the crowdsourcers, the IPO takes place. IPO prices in this case are fixed by the market 
maker or discovered by auctioning the asset on the market. Table 10 lists the 
clearinghouse processes under the methodology.  
Table 10. Methodology Clearinghouse Processes181 
Clearing House Processes 
Order 
Order matching rules Price and quantity 




Short selling Allowed 
Asset 
Asset type Play money 









Initial claims Quantity 
                                                 
181 Adapted from Gaspoz, Prediction Markets Supporting Technology, 83–85. 
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Clearing House Processes 
Claim ontology   
Claim type 




Claim structure  
Independent 
Payoff 
Settlement date Public 
Settlement judge   
Settlement price “Truth” 
 
As far as possible, the clearinghouse process the methodology uses should attempt 
to mimic that of real-world financial markets for several reasons. First, participants’ 
existing knowledge and how they work is leveraged. The analogy to real-world financial 
markets should make process related issues like buying, selling, buying on margin, and 
shorting easier to explain to participants. Second, when participants buy through buying 
on margin and shorting, it increases the efficiency of the market in theory to allow traders 
to trade on information that cannot be traded on using a simple buy or sell order. 
Similarly, the allowance of market and limit orders lets traders act efficiently on active 
market trends, whether or not they are actively on the trading platform. Third, by 
providing endowments each cycle, even comparatively unsuccessful traders can continue 
to trade across tournament cycles; remember that even unsuccessful traders add 
information to the market. Fourth, by using a DPM-based market maker, the 
crowdsourcers can ensure liquidity in comparatively thin markets with no risk. Fifth, by 
allowing winner-take-all, conditional, index-based, and spread-based contracts to be 
traded in the market, the crowdsourcers can accommodate a diversity of task designs 
easily. Sixth, the market having a public settlement date and an agreed settlement judge 
ensures that both the market and the settlement process are transparent and enjoy a clear 
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understanding of forecast stating what success is. Finally, having “truth” as the settlement 
price (the contract has a value of $1 or $0 at expiry, given the success of the forecast as 
determined by the settlement judge) allows a transparent way to determine the impact of 
forecast success or failure on a player’s portfolio. 
The trading process under the proposed methodology, as shown in Table 11, is 
characterized by no trading fees, an open order book, and the use of a DPM market 
maker. Trading fees in the methodology are not used because the effect of trading fees on 
prediction markets has not been studied in detail in the literature and because most extant 
prediction markets do not charge any of the types of trading fees.182 The researcher 
chose an open order book with 24/7 trading for reasons of transparency and to encourage 
informed, active trading. Finally, the researcher chose DPM market makers because they 
maintain the liquidity of the market, even in thin markets, and because they “attain the 
highest forecasting accuracy, good robustness against parameter misspecification, the 
ability to incorporate new information into prices, and the lowest losses for 
operators.”183 
Table 11. Methodology Trading Process184 
Trading Process 
Fees  None 
Trading 
Mechanisms 
Order Book Open Order Book 
Market maker Dynamic pari-mutuel 
                                                 
182 Gaspoz, Prediction Markets Supporting Technology, 88. 
183 Slamka, Skiera, and Spann, “Prediction Market Performance,” 169. 
184 Adapted from Hosseini et al., “On the Configuration of Crowdsourcing,” 27–45. 
105 
Trading Process 
Trading time 24/7 
A coherent set of rules for trader management is essential to the forecasting 
success of the methodology. First, by definition, the market is a closed market (open by 
invitation only) because it is crucial to gather and engage crowds with well understood 
demographics, skill sets, expertise, and psychographic profiles. In addition, some level of 
training is necessary so that the engaged crowd is motivated and appropriately 
incentivized. Second, as far as possible, the market should be fully transparent. The 
argument is that the market should be consistent with semi-strong form efficiency, and 
since opportunities may be limited, by definition, to trade on insider information. Third, 
in the methodology, a degree of anonymity is allowed. Participants are known by 
username, so that the gamified aspects of the market work effectively. However, 
participants’ actual identities are masked to prevent external concerns from inhibiting 
behavior. Investor unicity (not having multiple accounts) is also essential as the proper 
measurement of forecasting success requires it and because a lack of unicity may allow 
manipulation or misbehavior by participants. Finally, the management of the crowd 
selection process encourages diversity and largeness on parameters, such as demographic, 
psychographic, expertise, information access, experience, and education measures. Table 
12 addresses trader management issues.  
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Table 12. Trader Management Characteristics185 
Trader Management 
Market 
Market policy Closed market 
Market 
transparency Display all information 
Investor 
Investor anonymity Username 







H. PREDICTION MARKET PLATFORM CHARACTERISTICS 
Multiple commercial software platforms are available to use for implementing the 
methodology, including CrowdWorx, GNOSIS, Augur, and Inkling. Table 13 lists all 
these tools capable of performing the functions required of any platform implementing 
the methodology.  
  
                                                 
185 Adapted from Gaspoz, Prediction Markets Supporting Technology, 83–85.  
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Table 13. Trading Platform Characteristics186 
Facilities Short Descriptions 
1. Crowd-related Interactions Facilities in the platform that relate to the crowd 
1.1. Provide enrolment Means to enroll the individuals 
1.2. Provide authentication Means to authenticate the individuals 
1.4. Provide task assignment Means to assign tasks to the right individuals 
1.5. Provide assistance Means to help the individuals during the performing 
of the task 
1.6. Provide result submission Means to help the individuals to send their results 
1.7. Coordinate crowd Means to coordinate performers in a certain task 
1.8. Supervise crowd Means to supervise individuals during their 
performance 
1.9. Provide feedback loops Means to give feedback to individuals about their 
performance and about the results 
2. Crowdsourcer-related 
Interactions 
Facilities in the platform that relate to the 
crowdsourcer 
2.1. Provide task broadcast Means to broadcast the task to the right individuals 
2.2. Provide assistance Means to help the crowdsourcers for announcing the 
task 
2.3. Provide time negotiation Means to help crowdsourcers negotiate time 
requirements with the individuals 
2.7. Provide result verification Means to verify whether submitted results meet the 
needs of crowdsourcers 
2.8. Provide feedback loops Means to give feedback to crowdsourcers about 
individuals’ performances 
3. Task-related Facilities Facilities in the platform that relate to the task 
3.1. Aggregate results Means to collect and unify submitted results 
3.2. Hide results from others Means to hide individuals’ results from each other 
for privacy reasons 
3.3. Store history of completed 
tasks 
Means to keep a history of the completed tasks and 
related information (such as who completed them, 
the spent time, etc.) 
3.4. Provide quality threshold Means to guarantee the required quality of results 
                                                 
186 Adapted from Hosseini et al., “On the Configuration of Crowdsourcing,” 27–45. 
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Facilities Short Descriptions 
3.5. Provide quantity threshold Means to guarantee the required number of responses 
4. Platform-related Facilities Facilities in the platform that relate to the platform 
itself 
4.1. Online environment Means to keep the platform online and accessible to 
individuals 
4.2. Manage platform misuse Means to report if there are instances of platform 
misuse 
4.3. Provide ease of use Means to keep the platform simple to use 
4.4. Provide attraction Means to keep the platform attractive to use 
 
I. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has presented a description of a proposed methodology to improve 
intelligence analysis. The methodology is derived from work in previous chapters of this 
thesis, including work on (1) the implications of combining forecasts for accuracy, (2) a 
discussion of intelligence community culture in general, (3) a discussion of 
crowdsourcing and crowdsourced effort design, (4) a discussion of predictions markets 
and prediction markets design, and (5) a specific discussion of the implications of 
intelligence community culture on analytic methodologies. The chapter also discussed 
key aspects of the methodology, from the choice of crowd, the structure of the prediction 
market tournaments, participant incentive design, task design, prediction markets 
implementation and key prediction markets platform parameters. Although the details of 
how this proposed methodology is implemented and tested are in some sense part of the 
methodology itself, that aspect of the methodology is discussed in the next chapter.  
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VII. IMPLEMENTING AND TESTING THE METHODOLOGY 
AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
For the proposed methodology in this thesis to have relevance for its target 
audience, Intelligence Community analysts and analytical management, someone must 
implement and test it, as well as demonstrate the extent of its ability to improve the 
quality of intelligence analysis. A full-blown test may not be justified at this point; rather, 
this thesis recommends an incremental approach starting with implementing and testing 
the methodology on a small-scale pilot. First and foremost, the utility of the methodology 
needs to be demonstrated to the analytic branches of the intelligence to get buy-in to the 
methodology as a whole, as well as to engender participation in the methodology’s 
prediction market from individuals and teams drawn from the analytic community. 
Second, the results of the pilot, if positive, can be used to justify the Intelligence 
Community spending the financial, analytic-time based, administrative-time based, and 
other resources to implement the methodology. Third, the pilot should allow various 
aspects of the methodology, from outreach to task design, to be tested and tweaked to 
ensure that the methodology as implemented does indeed result in the analytic 
improvements being sought. Therefore, this chapter discusses practical aspects of setting 
up and implementing the pilot, practical aspects of scaling up the pilot to full-scale, and 
how both the pilot and the full-scale methodology is evaluated. 
B. IMPLEMENTING THE PILOT 
Implementation of the pilot must address (1) project sponsorship, (2) project 
outreach, (3) provision of participant training, (4) incentive implementation, (5) task 
design process, (6) task limitations, (7) prediction market software selection and 
configuration, and (8) pilot program operation and administration, including warmup 
tournaments, selection of superforecasters, teams and teaming, task success 
determination, and provision and timing of feedback. Each of these implementation 
factors is discussed further.  
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1. Project Pilot Sponsorship 
IARPA has sponsored several prediction markets-based attempts to produce high 
quality forecasts in the past through its ACE program in the past. The pilot differs from 
these prior efforts in three ways: (1) how it uses teams and teaming, (2) tasks and task 
design, and (3) the level of support provided to participants in the pilot in terms of 
training in probability and statistics, cognitive biases, and the workings of financial 
markets and financial instruments and by the analogy prediction markets assets, 
contracts, and instruments is far greater than in these earlier prediction markets-based 
forecasting methodologies and tests. All these differences are associated with increased 
forecasting accuracy in the literature. This researcher hopes that given the strongly 
positive results of the ACE associated Good Judgment Project, IARPA should be willing 
to provide the resources to explore methodologies like the one proposed in this thesis 
further.  
Alternatively, or if IARPA resources only cover part of the resource needs 
required for the pilot, the pilot should use a partnership approach. In this case, a 
supremely credible academic sponsor (a Tetlock or a Mellars in stature in the field) 
should take on the pilot and approach other leaders across the relevant academic and 
professional communities to help address participant outreach, participant incentivization, 
and participant training needs. It should also partner with one of the prediction markets 
software vendors to allow access to their platforms for use in the pilot. The sponsor 
should also create and manage teams of graduate or undergraduate students to address 
tasks and task design, administration of the prediction markets platform, and pilot 
program test and evaluation. In this way, the pilot will be run and tested on a shoestring 
budget. 
2. Project Pilot Outreach 
As the previous sections of the thesis discuss, getting the right crowd to 
participate in the pilot is crucial to its potential success. Indeed, the pilot sponsor must to 
implement a large, successful, scalable outreach effort. Additionally, sponsor outreach 
efforts must calibrate to deliver certain crowd characteristics, such as crowd diversity, 
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crowd motivation, large-crowd size, crowd scalability, crowd participation, and crowd 
responsiveness to incentives on offer.  
From an internal to the Intelligence Community perspective, the level of 
management commitment to the pilot will probably drive participation rates, the degree 
to which the pilot accommodates the cultural factors Chapter IV addresses, and on the 
perceived value of the pilot. The proper choice of sponsor (e.g., IARPA or a suitable 
academic leader) may help drive management buy in to the pilot and thus the degree to 
which management motivates individual analysts to participate. Appropriate 
accommodation with and exploitation of Intelligence Community cultural factors can also 
aid internal participation. A key issue is that the pilot will be testing more than just 
forecasting the simple probability of an event. Rather, more nuanced forecasts based on 
conditional events, mean value-based events and threshold-based events are part and 
parcel of the task designs to elicit forecasts. Note that the value of the pilot to intelligence 
analysts is to provide an alternative way to address nuanced questions independently and 
thus also provide useful information to their private (inside the Intelligence Community) 
forecasts.  
From an external to the Intelligence Community perspective, sponsor outreach 
effort must address crowd diversity and crowd largeness by focusing outreach efforts on 
the benefits to the participants in the pilot including:  
• possibility of contributing to intelligence and the Intelligence Community  
• emphasis on the gamified aspects of participation in the effort  
• use of challenge aspects of “beating the professional”  
• offer of the possibility of interacting with or indeed teaming with 
Intelligence Community professionals  
• training in finance and financial instruments participants will receive that 
can be applied in their own lives 
• offer of the possibility of winning the nominal prizes on offer  
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The creation of an easily navigable, attractive, and informative outreach website 
(separate from the pilot prediction market website) should aid outreach efforts. The 
sponsor should use both pull and push techniques to drive traffic to the outreach website 
and to get potential participants to register and subsequently participate in the pilot. The 
sponsor should place attractive advertising (similar to those used for SETI@HOME) in 
the online and print-based professional journals of each target community, trade journals, 
and general interest publications. Additionally, the sponsor should encourage preeminent 
bloggers in each relevant community to promote the pilot in their blogs.  
Potential participants should complete a short, but nonetheless useful survey, as 
part of the registration process to allow the pilot sponsors to target their efforts to ensure 
participant segment size and diversity across segments are being adequately addressed 
and achieved. The sponsors can use these efforts to address scalability concerns to adjust 
approaches to demographic, psychographic, expertise, and experience segments with low 
participation rates, and emphasize what works well to the detriment of ineffective 
approaches. Given that participants should have a choice as to which predictions to make 
(which contracts to buy) and that this information about choices should be available to 
the organizers, the crowdsources should redesign tasks with low participation rates 
redesigned to make them more attractive, or crowdsources can adjust their incentive 
structure for the same purpose. 
The warmup tournament phase of the pilot will allow the organizers to assess the 
drivers of crowd participation and crowd responsiveness to incentives on offer. 
Participants will be asked to complete periodic short questionnaires focusing on these 
drivers to thus allow organizers to determine what works and what does not in terms of 
driving participation and the effectiveness of incentives and make adjustments 
accordingly.  
3. Project Pilot Participant Incentivization 
Participants internal to the Intelligence Community can be incentivized by:  
• management support and management buy in 
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• perceived value of the approach to estimating and forecasting 
• payoffs in terms of social capital associated with teaming within, across, 
and external to the Intelligence Community  
• ability of participants to go beyond simple tasks to more complicated 
estimating tasks  
• gamified experience as manifested by leaderboards, missions etc.  
• nominal prizes, such as patches, coins etc., and real money awards from 
$20 to $50 for “beating the crowd” 
Additionally, participants external to the Intelligence Community can be 
incentivized to participate by:  
• possibility of contributing to intelligence and the Intelligence Community  
• emphasis on the gamified as aspects of participation in the effort  
• use of the challenge aspects of “beating the professional”  
• offer of the possibility of interacting with, or indeed, teaming with 
Intelligence Community professionals 
• training in finance and financial instruments participants will receive that 
can be applied in their own lives 
• offer of the possibility of winning the nominal prizes on offer  
The nominal prizes should include a variety of patches associated with task or 
mission completion, nominal prizes ranging from $20 to $50 for overall forecast 
accuracy, etc. 
4. Project Pilot Participant Training 
It is clear from the literature that training participants in probability and statistics 
and cognitive biases results in improved forecast performance. The pilot should provide 
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online, live, and self-paced training in these areas, as well as in the workings of financial 
markets and financial instruments. The latter should train participants in how prediction 
markets are analogous to financial markets, and as a result, on how prediction market 
assets, contracts, and instruments work in detail. Self-paced, web-based, and instructor-
led training can be developed by simply repurposing (with slight terminology changes) 
some of the large body self-paced and instructor-led content in introductory finance in 
academia. Another option is to partner with a provider, such as the Khan Academy, to 
develop and stream dedicated content. Training in the workings of the software platform 
itself has already been developed by most providers of such tools and can be tweaked 
fairly easily to reflect how participants should interact with the software platform and 
with other participants and the organizers of the estimation effort.  
5. Task Design and Task Limitations 
Tasks in the pilot should consist of participants estimating “one shot” 
probabilities of individual, unique events, estimating conditional probabilities for event 
sequences, estimating when an outcome exceeds a threshold, estimating a mean outcome, 
and estimating the likelihood and extent of forecast errors. These tasks should be limited 
by design during the pilot to geopolitical forecasts associated with future North Korean 
actions, statistics, economic performance, and the like.  
The pilot sponsor should design some of these tasks to be decomposable in to 
subtasks, each of which may or may not be serial in design or amenable to being 
performed in parallel. Other tasks may involve nuance. For example, the task related an 
asset traded on the market should require not only an estimate of a conditional probability 
but also an estimate of the forecast error associated with that conditional probability 
combined in a public and transparent way to determine asset value.  
The organizers should split tasks in the pilot into individual tasks and team tasks. 
Team and individual task payoffs should include an assessment of task complexity that is 
a multiplier for the payoff for a given task. The value of this multiplier is set by the pilot 
organizers prior to the task being posted for bids.  
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Both team and individual tasks have limitations in that sponsors may and should 
make adjustments for task complexity, task urgency, and the like, but these adjustments 
may likely decrease the transparency of the market due to the necessarily complex 
resulting payoff schemes. Sponsors should explore these limitations during the warmup 
phase of the pilot and adjust the task design as needed to ensure a fully functioning 
market that drives forecast accuracy. 
6. Prediction Market Software Selection and Configuration 
The pilot should use commercially available prediction market software 
configured to reflect the prediction market design and platform characteristics discussed 
in Chapter VI. Depending on the sponsor of the project, the software may be obtained on 
commercial terms or as part of a partnership agreement. The organizers must first select 
an appropriate software platform, configure it to be consistent with methodological and 
platform facility considerations, and operate the platform over the life of the pilot. In 
selecting the software platform for the pilot, the organizers may be limited in their 
choices to venders willing to partner with them for the pilot, or organizers may be able to 
purchase the software on commercial terms. In either case, the organizer’s team for the 
pilot must become expert at how to configure, administer, and operate the software. 
Furthermore, the organizer’s team must also manage the interface between the outreach 
website and the software platform. 
7. Pilot Program Operation and Administration 
Pilot program operation and administration activities include running the warmup 
tournaments, selection of superforecasters, teams and teaming, task success 
determination, and provision and timing of feedback. Prediction markets software 
platform should manage the purely administrative tasks, such as those associated with 
participant registration, participant account management, participant contact 
management, administrative aspects of participant task selection and tracking, forecast 
entry, task payoff accounting, portfolio accounting, feedback provision and tracking, 
game related list generation and tracking, award generation and provision, etc. These 
tasks are not discussed in detail in this thesis.  
116 
a. Warmup Tournament 
At the conclusion of the initial outreach effort (a sufficiently large, diverse, and 
motivated crowd chosen to participate), the organizers should start the education phase of 
the pilot. The organizers need to provide access to in person and online training 
appropriate for the pilot and discussed previously. Once a suitable fraction of potential 
participants has completed the training on offer, the pilot project proper should begin 
with a warmup tournament. During this phase, three to five forecasting tasks of each type 
(estimating “one shot” probabilities, participants estimating conditional probabilities for 
event sequences, estimating when an outcome exceeds a threshold, estimating a mean 
outcome, and estimating the likelihood and extent of forecast errors) associated with 
future North Korean actions, statistics, economic performance, and the like should be on 
offer from which potential participants can choose. Participants should be able to choose 
(bid on) some, all, or none of the tasks on offer. Sponsors should use bidding 
information, coupled with data gathered via survey when participants first register for the 
pilot, to ensure that tasks have sufficiently large, diverse, and well trained crowds 
working on them. If not, organizers should adjust both task design and outreach efforts to 
ensure that the crowd for each task has the appropriate characteristics. At this point, 
participants should be allowed to form teams (or if they have stated they are amenable to 
working in teams, organizers should place them in teams). Participants should be allowed 
to participate in the warmup tournament as individuals, self-formed teams, or organizer-
formed teams. The warmup tournament will run for six months, at which point sponsors 
should evaluate individual and team performance.  
b. Teams and Teaming 
Sponsors should test characteristics related to teams and teaming during the 
warmup tournament. As mentioned previously, participants should be allowed to 
participate in the warmup tournament as individuals, self-formed teams, or organizer-
formed teams. Sponsors should assess the performance of teams during the warmup 
tournament on an ongoing basis to allow the real-time capture of any relationships 
between team composition, characteristics, participation rates, task choice, and forecast 
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accuracy. Then, sponsors should feed this information back into the task design and 
outreach processes to ensure that the crowd of teams is characterized by adequate 
diversity, backgrounds, expertise, and largeness. One aspect of teams and teaming that 
sponsors should explicitly examine during the warmup phase is the impact of the addition 
or deletion on Intelligence Community members to the teams on performance. The 
sponsors also need to examine the performance of teams with a membership consisting of 
Intelligence Community members. 
c. Selection of Superforecasters 
During the warmup of the tournament, sponsors should select individual and team 
superforecasters. Sponsors should deem individuals and teams in the top decile of 
forecast performance during the warmup tournament superforecasters and their forecasts 
should be included in the prediction market by first allowing them to participate in a 
superforecasters only prediction market, and with appropriate adjustment, also to trade in 
the overall prediction market. In theory, superior forecasts in both markets are allowed 
with the added bonus that the overall market may capture information outside the market 
consensus.  
d. Task Success Determination 
Sponsors should design all tasks during the pilot so that forecast success, failure, 
or margin is clear at the end of each market period. Proper task design should ensure that 
even complex, nuanced tasks posed to the market have outcomes that sponsors can assess 
beyond a doubt.  
e. Provision and Timing of Feedback 
In some sense, the market price of the contract under trade should provide 
feedback. However, given that forecast performance improves with feedback, it behooves 
the organizers to provide participants with feedback beyond that simply of asset portfolio 
value. Given that contract settlement only occurs at the end of each forecast period, 
sponsors should not provide feedback during the pilot. However, sponsors should provide 
feedback from the pilot and from each subsequent round of forecasting to participants by 
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given them a document reflecting the forecast performance of the market broken down by 
participant characteristic, task characteristics (design), task complexity, and the evolution 
of asset value over time (which can be compared to the value of an individual or team’s 
assets and portfolios over time, which should also be available).  
f. Evaluating the Pilot of the Methodology  
Sponsors should initially evaluate the pilot of the methodology at the conclusion 
of the warmup tournament, and subsequently, at the end of each forecast period. The 
sponsors should evaluate several items of interest, including:  
• individual and team forecast accuracy within and across tasks using Brier 
scores (where mutually exclusive discrete forecasts are involved) and 
mean squared error or mean absolute error (for tasks where forecasts are 
not mutually exclusive)  
• side-by-side comparison of forecast error using the methodology versus 
forecast errors generated using traditional intelligence analytic processes  
• impact of individual demographic, psychographic, experience and 
expertise factors on team performance  
• impact of task design and task complexity on forecast accuracy  
• impact of task design and task complexity on individual and team task 
selection  
• impact of training on forecast accuracy  
• whether or not superforecaster performance remains stable from round to 
round; if not the case, the sponsor should shut down the pilot, as the major 
premise of the methodology—that superforecasters exist and consistently 
overperform in terms of forecast accuracy—will have been falsified  
Beyond this test, sponsors should use the results of the evaluation effort to 
improve the task design, especially for complex tasks, and to guide outreach efforts to 
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attract individuals with profiles reflecting demographic, psychographic, experience and 
expertise factors most associated with forecast accuracy. Sponsors should only scale up 
the pilot if it confirms the expectation of increased forecast accuracy when compared to 
traditional methods, and if it is able to attract a large enough, diverse enough crowd to 
participate in the project. 
C. SCALING UP THE PILOT 
If the pilot is successful, sponsors can then scale up the pilot to address tasks 
beyond those related to North Korea. The best (most successful) task designs from the 
pilot can serve as examples for how these new tasks will be structured. Sponsors should 
enhance outreach efforts to make the participating crowd even bigger, more diverse, and 
one reflective of desired areas of experience and expertise. Sponsors should implement 
learning from the pilot regarding teams and teaming, especially those related to team 
structure and composition for increased forecast accuracy. Additionally, sponsors should 
test alternative forecast horizons (three months instead of six months or one year versus 
six months) in the scaled up application of the methodology. Sponsors should provide 
feedback from forecast session to forecast session to all participants and the impact of 
feedback on forecast accuracy tested.  
D. CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis has proposed a methodology for applying crowd-based analytic 
methodologies to the problem of intelligence analysis while accounting for and taking 
advantage of the unique characteristics of the intelligence analysis process and the 
Intelligence Community culture itself. The crowd-based techniques utilized in developing 
the methodology include using combined forecasts based on prediction markets-based 
technique and crowdsourcing techniques to improve forecast accuracy. The thesis’ 
particular contribution focuses on understanding the unique characteristics of the 
Intelligence Community culture and work processes as a basis for applying crowd-based 
methodology to improve predictions of real-world events.  
This thesis is just a starting point; the methodology should be subject to several 
rounds of peer review and revision before implementation, even in pilot form. Once this 
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review and revision occurs, sponsors can implement the pilot and test the reality of the 
methodology creating consistently more accurate forecasts than traditional methods. If 
the pilot is successful, the methodology becomes one more tool in the intelligence 
analysts’ quiver. At the end of the day, if the degree of success or failure of the 
methodology is knowable once, at a minimum, the pilot runs. If successful, analysts can 
then use the methodology both for intelligence analysis and for any field in which 
forecasts are subject to significant uncertainty. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 14 provides a summary of the mean error reductions by combining 
forecasts across 30 studies that Armstrong reviewed.  
Table 14. Error Reduction Resulting from Combining Forecasts187 
 
  
                                                 
187 Adapted from Armstrong, “Combining Forecasts,” 417–439. 
 
Exhibit 1 















Levine (1960) intentions 2 MAPE annual capital expenditures 6 1 18.0 
Okun (1960) “ 2 “ “ housing starts 6 1 7.0 
Landefeld & Seskin (1986) “ 2 MAE “ plant & equipment 11 1 20.0 
Armstrong et al. (2000) “ 4 RAE “ consumer products 65 varied 5.5 
 
Winkler & Poses (1993) expert 4 Brier cross-section   survival of patients 231 varied 12.2 
Thorndike (1938) “ 4 to 6 % wrong “ knowledge questions 30 varied 6.6 
Makridakis et al. (1993) “ 5 MAPE monthly economic time series 322 1 thru 14 19.0 
Richards & Fraser (1977) “ 5 “ annual company earnings 213 1 8.1 
Batchelor & Dua (1995) “ 10 MSE “ macroeconomic 40 1 16.4 
Kaplan et al. (1950) “ 26 % wrong cross-section   technology events 16 varied 13.0 
Zarnowitz (1984) “ 79 RMSE quarterly macroeconomic 288 1 10.0 
 
Sanders & Ritzman (1989) extrapolation 3 MAPE daily public warehouse 260 1 15.1 
Makridakis & Winkler (1983) “ 5 “ monthly economic time series 617 18 24.2 
Makridakis et al. (1993) “ 5 “ “ “ 322 1 thru 14 4.3 
Lobo (1992) “ 5 “ quarterly company earnings 6,560 1 thru 4 13.6 
Schnaars (1986) “ 7 “ annual consumer products 1,412 1 thru 5 20.0 
 
Landefeld & Seskin (1986) econometric 2 MAE annual plant & equipment 7 1 21.0 
Clemen & Winkler (1986) “ 4 MAD quarterly GNP (real & nominal) 45 1 thru 4 3.4 




expert/extrap 2 MAPE 
 
company earnings 6,560 1 thru 4 
 
11.0 
Lawrence et al. (1986) “ 3 “ annual monthly economic time series 1,224 1 thru 18 10.7 
Sanders & Ritzman (1989) “ 3 “ daily public warehouse 260 1 15.5 
Lobo & Nair (1990) “ 4 “ annual company earnings 768 1 6.4 
Landefeld & Seskin (1986) intentions/econ 2 MAE annual plant & equipment 11 1 11.5 
Vandome (1963) extrap/econ 2 MAPE quarterly macroeconomic 20 1 10.1 
Armstrong (1985) “ 2 “ annual photo sales by country 17 6 4.2 
Weinberg (1986) expert/econ 2 “ cross-section   performing arts 15 varied 12.5 
Bessler & Brandt (1981) exprt/extrap/econ 3 “ quarterly cattle & chicken prices 48 1 13.6 
Fildes (1991) “ 3 MAE annual construction 72 1 & 2 8.0 
Brandt & Bessler (1983) “ 6 MAPE quarterly hog prices 24 1 23.5 
 
Unweighted average 12.5 
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